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Introduction
This review of the World Bank's latest report on Africa provides critical comments by
ASC research staff representing different academie disciplines.1
It has 3 sections. Section 1 summarizes the Bank's appraisal of Africa's past and
current developments. In section 2 the Bank's proposed remedial stratégies and the
conditions that need to be met if Africa is 'to claim the 21 st Century' are outlined.
Section 3 contains critical observations provided by ASC staff.
1. Africa's performance: The Bank's appraisal2
Introduction
This latest World Bank report on Africa is a product of 'the growing collaboration
among some of the main institutions involved in African development: The African
Development Bank, the African Economie Research Consortium, the Global Coalition for
Africa, the United Nations Economie Commission for Africa and the World Bank'
(report's back page). This apparently suggests that the Bank has incorporated a wide
range of (African) views in this report and thus cannot be accused of having confined
its scope to a mere World Bank desk perspective.
Economie and social decay
The report begins with a review of the many distressing trends in sub-Saharan
Africa's (SSA) major economie and social indicators. Based on an already extremely
low level of total GDP income (not much more than that of Belgium),3 per capita output
was lower at the close of the 20th Century than it was 30 years ago in the 1970s. The
' The three research staff include Deborah Bryceson (economie geographer), Jan Abbink (anthropologist)
and Henk Meilink (economist).
2 Text: Henk Meilink.
3 The mediaïTGDP of the 48 SSA countries amounts to only $2 billion which equates to the output of a
town of 60,000 inhabitants in a rieh country. This implicitly means that the size of many individual
country's local markets is 'uneconomically limited'. Hence the Bank supports 'regional economie
intégration' initiatives on the African continent, as expressed in Chapter 7.
number of poor people has grown relentlessly (more than 40% of its population of
600 million now live below the internationally recognized poverty line of $1 a day)
and caused SSA's share of the world's absolute poor to increase from 25% to 30%
during the 1990s. The Bank notes that much of this development is the product of
growing income inequality, uneven access to resources, social exclusion and insecurity
(p.10). Growing poverty is also reflected in the trends of the health and educational
indicators: in many countries 200 out of every 1,000 children die before the age of
five. More than 250 million people lack access to safe water and more than 200
million do not have access to basic health services. Furthermore the devastating impact
of the HIV/AIDS crisis is expected to reduce life expectancy by up to 20 years from
today's modest levels and to dramatically increase the number of AIDS orphans in the
most afflicted countries.
On the éducation front, trends have been similarly adverse. More than 140 million
youth are illiterate and less than one quarter of poor rural females attend primary
school. Government spending on éducation in poor African countries averages less than
$50 per capita per year compared to $11,000 in rieh countries such as France and
the United States.
Focusing on the macro-economie indicators, trends are likewise disappointing. Africa's
share in world trade has fallen to less than 2% and the continent continues to be
largely an exporter of primary products as was the case three decades ago. In the
1970-1993 period this led to a staggering annual income loss of $68 billion
(amounting to 21% of the continent's GDP). In contrast to other developing régions,
investment and savings levels per capita have further declined and are now far below
the required level for a renewal of economie growth. Low savings have been
compounded by rapid population growth (3%) and continued environmental
dégradation. Fiscal revenues per capita in real terms at the end of the 1990s were
smaller than in the late 1960s for many African governments.
African économies have also remained highly aid-dependent and deeply indebted. In the
average African country official aid flows represent about 10% of GDP equivalent to
almost 50% of public spending. And the debt bürden has now accumulated to around
100% of GDP in net present value terms (p.9).
Political changes
All these worrying economie and social trends coincided with turbulent changes in
Africa's political landscape.
Since 1980 the rôle of the state in African économies has radically changed. Forced by
serious balance of payment crises and accumulating external debts, African
governments had no alternative but to accept the introduction of 'structural adjustment





















liberalization and privatization were the key concepts guiding these SAPs. The
adjustment policies abruptly brought an end to the extensive and highly politically-
driven intervention actions of African governments. The new rôle for the state was
scaled down to one of creating 'an enabling environment' conducive to mobilizing
private sector enterprise.
By the end of the 1980s the reduced economie rôle of African governments was followed
by political reforms away from the single-party political System under the leadership
of authoritarian African leaders and towards the introduction of the principles of
democratie structures based on multiparty représentation. At the end of the 1990s in
42 of the 48 SSA states multiparty presidential or parliamentary élections had been
held (albeit with varying degrees of 'fairness credibility').
However on the negative side also many countries feil victim in the 1990s to numerous
violent internai conflicts and serious processes of state disintegration and lawlessness.
The report notes that in 1999 20% of the African population lived in countries
severely disrupted by war or civil conflict. These countries include Burundi, the
Democratie Republic of Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Angola, Somalia,
Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea.
Africa's crisis expiained
Importantly, the Bank rejects the widely held view that civil conflicts are primarily
caused by the phenomenon of African tribalism fueled by the numerous ethnie and
religieus cleavages prevailing on the continent. In contrast the report states that:
'ethnie diversity is a déterrent rather than a cause of civil war'(p.60).
lts alternative explanation suggests that a combination of poverty, unemployment
(especially among Africa's youth) and processes of political exclusion is the root cause
of civil conflict (p.49). The report stresses that in the past 'highly centralized African
governance Systems' in which governments were solely accountable to narrow interest
groups have contributed to the marginalization of large parts of their populations
{p.58). In the emerging socially fractionalized societies (with widespread gender
inequality in access to productive resources), many are excluded from fundamental
politica! rights and civil liberties and are denied participation in productive economie
activities. Combined with an associated increase in poverty, this has developed into an
explosive vicious circle of conflict, poverty and exclusionary politics (p.58).
Africa's economie crisis is explained by a host of interacting factors. Part of the slow
growth is attributable to the fact that Investment tends to be more costly in Africa
compared jp other developing régions. Furthermore the productivity of investments is
extremely low amounting to only half the level achieved in Asia. Negative external
trade performances also loom large in explaining low growth rates. The large réduction
in Africa's share in world trade represente a high annual income loss of $68 billion
during the 1970-1993 period (p.20). Worsening terms of trade, especially for non-
oil exporting countries, also contributed largely to the loss of income. Cumulative
losses during 1970-1997 amounted to a staggering 120% of SSA's GDP. In contrast,
Africa's oil exporters could have benefited from significant terms of trade gains. But
unfortunately these countries failed to transform these gains into productive
Investment which could have placed them on the path to sustainable growth.4
Other explanatory factors discussed by the Bank are geographical: the high number of
landlocked countries on the African continent and the spatial distribution of African
populations. Démographie characteristics such as high dependence ratios, low life
expectancy, low population densities and high population growth rates help to provide
an explanation as well as other factors including the small market size of many African
countries, their concentration on a limited range of primary export commodities and
their high aid dependence.
However the Bank in a traditional vein puts much of the blâme for Africa's slow
economie growth on the undermining, counterproductive policies pursued by African
governments especially during the 1970s. These policies have involved 'extensive and
arbitrary régulation and frequently the prohibition of trade and have heavily taxed the
agricultural sector' (p.25). Trade and exchange rate policies have equally discouraged
exports and encouraged local firms 'to produce under noncompetitive conditions for
small, captured domestic markets, undermining the basis for industrial growth'
(p.26).
Many of these dismal policies were rectified by the 'structural adjustment
programmes' embarked upon since 1980. Fiscal déficits and inflation rates have
dropped significantly and many countries have succeeded in broadening their tax base
(mostly value added taxes), while at the same time curbing their budget expenditures.
Most priées have been decontrolled and are now market-determined. Many marketing
boards have been eliminated and international trade taxes have been 'rationalized from
high and arbitrary levels' (p.31). There has also been more space for private sector
initiative. In politically and economically stable countries private Investment and
business networks have grown as well as foreign direct Investment. New inroads into
financing and infrastructural services (téléphone, railways, water and roads) have
occurred. Especially during the 1994-1998 period, SSA witnessed improved
performance in all indicators. GDP output, agriculture and exports grew rapidly and
well above previous levels.
4 Somewhat ironically the Bank notes that 'excessively positive shocks can destabilize development as
much as negative ones' (p.21).
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Unfortunately this upsurge came to an end in 1998 when African countries were
exposed to the direct conséquences of the East Asian crisis and suffered sharp déclines
in their export commodity priées. In 1999 and 2000 growth has somewhat resumed.
Although the Bank recognizes the methodological hurdles involved in evaluating the
effects of structural adjustment, the report concludes that 'good economie management
and sound policies pay off in the medium term' (p.35). Furthermore avoidance of
political conflict has also proved to be critical in accelerating economie growth.
Having said this, the Bank does not shy away from emphasizing some of the difficult
legacies (called 'hystérésis effects') left by the long period of macro-economie
adjustment. Unfortunately the list is long: a substantial détérioration in the quality of
public institutions; demoralization among public servants; a décline in the
effectiveness of service delivery; falling social indicators and a loss of human capital;
underspending in sector and program budgets leaving programs performing poorly ;
intrusive donor conditionality and external shaping of reforms which 'weakened
internai capacity for economie management and reduced African governments' sense of
ownership and accountability for economie outcomes' (p.37). Government-donor
arrangements also had the serious effect of eroding the rôle of représentative
institutions such as parliaments and undermined their législative and budgetary
functions.
Before turning to its 'agenda for thé future', thé Bank, in a somewhat overoptimistic
mood, concludes that 'a fragile consensus between Africa and its donors has emerged'
(p.38). Both partners in development, African governments and donors,5 have learned
their lessons. There is a greater understanding of the need for a stable macro economy
in Africa, for working markets, for private initiative and for increased African
competitiveness in global markets. Donors on their part have realized 'the limits of a
narrow macro-économie approach and understood that 'market-driven development
cannot succeed without a strong social and institutional infrastructure - including a
strong and capable state - and without active measures to alleviate sévère poverty and
raise thé capacity of the population' (p.38).
' Presumably including thé World Bank itself?
3. Critical observations by ASC staff
This section brings together points of criticism provided by three research staff
members of the African Studies Centre. Each has selected a number of chapters for
review. All reviews combined cover all 8 chapters of the report. The structure of this
section is as follows: firstly brief summaries of comments of each contributor are
presented. These are followed by the présentation of the füll text contributions in
separate appendices.
SUMMARY OF D. BRYCESON'S8 COMMENTS
(covering Chapters 1, 4 and 6)
• The following comments are directed at assessing the robustness of the World
Bank's analysis of the current situation in sub-Sahara Africa and the feasibility of its
policy recommendations.
Chapter 1: Can Africa Claim the 21st Century?
• The World Bank is in the process of changing its position on a number of key issues
that have underpinned its reform programme since the early 1980s:
- The World Bank has replaced its traditional three-sectoral approach (modern
formal urban sector, informal urban sector, and peasant rural sector) by a
more atomistic agency approach with overlapping actor catégories: 1)
government, 2) civil society, 3) the poor, and 4) producers, donors and
foreign investors.
- The long-iasting view that African peasant farmers can compete in the global
markets is now being questioned. Emphasis on the need to boost African exports
leaves 'African exports' largely unspecified and the response of African peasants
to supposed reform incentives is not mentioned. Peasant smallholders have
largely dropped out of the development équation and have been replaced with
vaguely denoted 'rural producers', who could be highly capitalised large-scale
farmers as well as impoverished smallholders.




- The Bank has moved to recognising that in the process of liberalising local
markets there have been 'winners' and 'losers'. Essentially the World Bank's
current emphasis on poverty alleviation is to shore up the short-term losers
who have lost income or livelihood by virtue of market compétition and
economie restructuring. However the Bank avoids identifying the reform
programmes with widespread poverty expansion.
- More than previous World Bank policy statements on Africa, this report
acknowledges the rôle of world market's economie shocks as causes of setbacks
in African national économies. Thus the Bank's exhortation to African policy
makers to diversify their économies thereby immunising themselves from such
shocks.
- As to the effects of structural adjustment measures the Bank avoids
straightforward responsibility by introducing the obscure, catch-ail phrase of
'hystérésis effects1 meaning the working of adverse factors related to on-going
historical legacies that can not easily be reversed. In this way some of the
critique of SAPs is taken on board without any admission of SAP's inadequacies.
- Another change in the Bank's logic is the revaluation of urban areas that were
previously cast as 'havens for corrupt and rent-seeking African government
officials'. Now the potential economie catalyzing influence of these areas is
acknowledged and linked to the rôle of an entrepreneurial business class.
- The World Bank (now retreating from an extreme anti-government position)
shows a more supportive attitude towards African governments' coordinating
and infrastructural provisioning tasks.
- The bulk of Africa's population, the rural smallholders, have lost explicit
policy attention and are transferred to the ranks of the 'poor' where their
welfare cause can be addressed in terms of 'investing in people'.
« Overall, there is a great deal of analytical fudging. The text does not convey a sense
of African économies' overall structure. Policy recommendations are not
contextualised within some notion of an overall operational economie order.
• During the past two decades of structural adjustment and libéralisation policies, the
African continent has experienced: a squeeze on its share in world trade to an almost
negligible amount, a skyrocketing external debt and escalating poverty. However the
Bank's own rôle in these tendencies is avoided. The internet debate on the World
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Development Report 2000-01 has rightly questioned the accountability of the World
Bank itself, as Africa's main policy-setting agency.
Chapter 4: Investing in People
• The Bank fails to address thé causes of the current 'human development crisis'.
Despite widespread évidence of the systematic run-down of social services connected
with thé implementation of SAPs (documented by international NGOs like Oxfam and
HIVOS CHECK), the World Bank circumvents thé issue. Direct discussion of the
impact of SAPs on Africa's social service infrastructure (éducation and health in
particular) is avoided. The Bank does not allude to the widely held opinion that 20
years of Bank-enforced policies have engendered educational deprivation and
declining health standards with escalating infant mortality and général morbidity and
mortality. These trends contrast with that of the 1960s and 1970s, when post-
colonial governments made considérable strides in lowering infant mortality rates
and raising général health standards in rural and urban areas.
• Instead thé Bank proceeds to announce incredibly ambitious goals for 2015 in thé
fields of public health and mass éducation. The question of the funding and
implementation of thèse goals are left hanging, with a vague call for 'décentralisation'
and reliance on private and Community initiatives.
• The report does not acknowledge that, in addition to thé underfunding and collapse of
educational and health services, thé human development crisis is related to far-
reaching shifts in rural and urban livelihood. As DGIS-funded research at the African
Studies Centre has shown, thé need for African households to diversify their incomes
and seek income-generating activities outside of agriculture given declining returns
to peasant agricultural production has led to children's earnings becoming
indispensable in many households. Not surprisingly, school enrolments are declining
as school fées become unaffordable and children become more active in thé labour
force. Furtherrnoe, studies suggest that thé growing importance of alcohol production
as a ready form of income-earning, has led to rising alcohol consumption abuse and
associated feelings of démoralisation. The possible link of alcohol abuse in thé heavy-
drinking cultures of southern Africa with the high incidence of HIV/AIDS incidence
should not be overlooked.
Chapter 6: Spurring Agricultural and Rural Development
« In thé chapter on 'agricultural and rural development', thé Bank no longer portrays
thé African smallholder as 'thé engine of growth' as it did in previous reports. It is

















North American highly capitalisée! (and subsidized) farmers. However again the far-
reaching effect of SAPs on African peasant smallholders is glossed over.
•Distinctions between different types of agricultural producers are foresaken in the
report. Smallholders and 'agroindustry' are simply lumped together without
explanation. Therefore the claim that 'recent reforms have improved agricultural
priée incentives' can be ambiguously understood as large-scale agro-industrialists
having responded to priée incentives. But the reforms have had an adverse effect on
smallholder peasants. Their agricultural production is increasingly unremunerative.
Dismantled parastatal marketing boards and their replacement by private traders
confronted peasant farmers with a more insecure market environment, widely
fkictuating producer priées, rocketing input priées and tenuous input supply. This
coincided with the increased cash requirements under the economie stringency of
SAPs.
• The Bank correctly documents the tendency for grain producer priées and urban
consumer priées to have declined within the liberalised markets. However this
récognition is in sharp contrast to the original stated expected reform outcome of
increased farmer priées as a resuit of the removal of exploitative government
marketing boards. Again there is no outright acknowledgment by the Bank of this
misjudged outcome.
• In earlier Bank reports the rôle of non-traditional export crops, in particular
horticultural products, in reviving African agriculture was stressed. In this report
this strategy has been abandoned perhaps because of its infeasibility for the majority
of small peasant producers who lack the technological and organisational capacities to
adhère to highly standardized product output and the need for strictly scheduled (often
refrigerated) delivery of produce to international airports.
• Concern for the fate of smallholder peasants under SAP and economie libéralisation
is conspicuously absent in this report. Their flight from agriculture into the low paid
informal sector (deagrarianisation) is simply ignored. It seems that the economie
prospects of masses of African peasant farmers and their agrarian labour redundancy
are quietly being swept out of view.
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Overall Comments on the Report
• This document represents the culmination of years of World Bank's neglect of
rigorous research on actual economie and social trends on the African continent.
During the past two decades, World Bank's analytical attention has been primarily
directed at assessing the degree to which African countries' are conforming to
market-led growth theory and models, rather than documenting what is actually
happening to people's patterns of production and welfare.
• The World Bank's current réalisation and hésitant admission that something is
wrong and that African welfare is seriously jeopardized is tainted by a 'face-saving'
effort to gloss over the record of ineffectiveness of World Bank policies in sub-
Saharan Africa over the last two decades. Now, as evidenced in this report, the Bank
has hastily constructed a humanitarian concern for the poor which, in the absence of
economie policies that genuinely address the livelihood needs of the poor, is likely to
cause the prolifération not the contraction of their numbers.
Summary of J. Abbink9 comments
(covering Chapters 1-4 and 8).
• The approach of the report is comprehensive and ambitious. In its quest for answers
to the question why Africa 'lagged behind' a large number of economical and
developmental factors that impinge upon Africa and explain its long period of crisis are
being reviewed.
» However, due to this ambitious scope the report suffers from a high level of
generalization and a highly prescriptive tone. There is a great deal of 'ought', 'should'
and 'need to'-clauses demanding an almost impossible 'reform agenda' for African
countries.
» Unfortunately, in evaluating Africa's past performance the WB specifically relies on
WB 'in-house', economically-oriented documents, largely by-passing many available
non-economie studies. There are few références or acknowledgements to scholarly
work undertaken outside the W.B. research framework. This does not tally with the
suggested 'holistic' approach in this report of the need to incorporate issues of politics
and 'civil society'.
For the füll text of Abbink's comments see Appendix B.
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• Moreover, in evaluating Africa's conditions, a critical assessment of the rôle of the
Bank itself is virtually absent. For example, the Bank should have devoted more space
to an explicit discussion of its policy impact on 'Structural Adjustment Programmes',
its policies towards agriculture, and towards 'African governance'. In particular the
Bank could have been more self-critical in admitting that its current remarkable
reappraisai of the state (advocating the necessity for 'strong African states') stands in
sharp contrast to its previous insistence on 'reducing the rôle of the state and make
more room for market forces and private initiatives'. SAPs may have led to macro-
economie improvements but the Bank should acknowledge that these gains have come at
the price of blighting the social service sector, health care and éducation, and the state
institutional structures themselves. Macro-economie winnings are also associated with
a loss of trained personnel and staff from the state and to a genera! undermining of
public trust in, and legitimacy of, the African state. In short, macro-economie success
may have come bouncing back at an even greater social cost. Nowhere in the report
there is a tracé of acknowledging some WB responsibility for these developments.
• The Bank's favorable account of political liberalization processes with increased
democratie participation of diverse groups and increased pressure for government
accountability and better economie management is laudable. The end of the Gold War
may also have reduced political global rivalry. However, what is ignored is that these
trends are reversible, and often cornpromised by the ambivalent policies of donor
countries in their relations with Africa. An example are the blatant mistakes of the
international donor community vis-à-vis the so-called 'new leaders', who became
embroiled in destructive wars (Eritrea versus Ethiopia, Uganda in DR Congo). The WB
and other donors often do not foresee the problems of undemocratic regimes of
questionable legitimacy because they do not make an appropriate analysis of the
political dynamics and system of governance of these regimes.
• Among the numerous required political reforms enhancing good governance, civil
service efficiency, commitment and efficiënt budgeting, the new catchword is
decentralization (strengthening local government institutions). However, a critical
assessment lacks of the meaning of this term and of the actual workings of African
politics as rooted in society and constrained by historical and cultural factors
mediating 'power', redistribution of resources and elite politics.
• The core issue of current WB policy is poverty réduction. Basically, this is to be
achieved by faster economie growth and employment création, together with a
réduction in inequality. The approach, however, is characterized by a high level of
abstraction and normative thinking. What is lacking is a more detailed analysis of the
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emerging patterns of labour migration and the alternative employment stratégies
pursued by the poor themselves. Moreover, African governments' commitment to a
poverty réduction strategy is highly overrated.
• The Bank stresses that an essential ingrédient to combat poverty and exclusion is to
invest in health and éducation services. Proposais are made to improve the 'service
delivery mechanisms'. A key word again is 'decentralization'. The required strong
commitment on the part of African governments is again conveniently assumed. This is
highly unlikely in the light of the impact that past WB/IMF policies had on African
state budgets, in particular the concomitant déclines in the provision of health and
éducation services.
• In the last chapter, on aid dependency, debt and international 'partnership', there is a
critica! discussion of donor dominance and self-interest, which have inhibited local
initiative and choice, capacity building, ownership and transparency. The report
rightly pleads for a more equal partnership between donors and récipients. But how do
these principles relate to the almost unilaterally set WB-IMF conditions of 'good
governance' and a proven commitment to political reforms (democratization) which
are so prominently emphasised in Chapter 2 of the report?
Summary of H. Meïlink's comments
(Overall + Chapters 5 and 7)
• The report represents an admirable effort to highlight the numerous economie,
political, socio-cultural and historica! factors that are shaping Africa's current
position. It examines the continent's prospects and conditions for positive change in a
holistic methodological approach
• Compared to previous World Bank reports on Africa there is a remarkable shift from
the traditional emphasis on macro-économie technicalities to political issues and
thèmes of 'good governance', civil society, strong African states, and civil liberties and
rights. Although discussion of thé latter topics were not absent in previous reports, thé
chapter structure and séquence of thèmes discussed in this report testifies to thé fact








• It is also laudable that in its detailed search for explanations of Africa's persistent
crisis, the traditional downplaying of such factors as colonialism, the world market
priée shocks and the declining trend in Africa's terms of trade have been reconsidered
and are now accepted as formidable obstacles to development which are largely beyond
the control of incumbent African governments.
• The report acknowledges that 20 years of 'structural adjustment programmes' in
Africa have not prevented a dramatic décline in basic éducation, health and poverty
indicators (p.37, 105 and 109). But the Bank is conspicuously reluctant to admit the
existence of a causal link between W.B. and IMF reform programs and this dismal
indicator performance. Therefore there is no tendency to accept a shared
responsibility, together with failing African governments, for the crisis. The Bank
shouid be more 'accountable' (a condition it imposes on African governments)10 and
openly face the negative effects of SAPs such as drastic cuts in government
expenditure, a massive entrenchment of civil servants, the removal of agricultural
input susidies and rapid import trade liberalization.
• The Bank adopts a defensive stance by proclaiming that SAPs in Africa have positively
affected poverty: 'many poor groups - those linked to markets and public services
-have benefited from the reforms and economie recovery of the 1990s' (p.95).
However the évidence as yet is thin and fragmentary. How SAPs have impacted on poor
population groups is a critical but difficult question which continues to be the subject
of intense academie debate. Méthodologies and frameworks available for analysing this
relationship (usually 'computable equilibrium models' and 'social accounting
matrixes') are beset with methodological flaws. For this reason some researchere11
have argued that a postive conclusion is largely derived from the theoretical
assumptions made about parameters, relationships and closure in the models rather
than derived from empirical vérification. They show that the actual expérience of the
poor differs from that predicted by the models. Others have stressed that there can be
no définitive conclusion due to the complexity of the poverty problem.12 There is no
single class of the poor in Africa. Diverse poverty groups participate differently in the
economy and hence are differently affected by a particular reform measure. Most
reform measures are bound to benefit some groups and harm others. An example is the
effect of a dévaluation. Cash erop farmers and landless labourers may benefit as
producer priées and cash erop employment tend to rise. But the poor living in urban
10 See N. Woods, (2000) "The Challenge of Good Governance for the IMF and the World Bank
Themselves'Vin World Development, Vol. 28, No. 5, May.
11 Lorenzo de Maio, Francis Stewart & Rolph van der Hoeven (1999) "Computable General Equilibrium
Models and the Poor in Africa", in World Development, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 453-470.
12 See Tony Killick, "Making Adjustment Work for the Poor", ODI Poverty Briefing, No. 5, May 1999.
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areas may be expected to suffer from the inflationary effects (a rise in the cost of
living index) induced by the dévaluation measure. The effect on rural résidents is also
ambivalent depending on whether they are net buyers or net sellers of food. Net
consumers of food will be confronted with food price increases while those who are net
(market) producers may benefit. To make things even more complicated, groups may
change position during the agricultural season (due to seasonal fluctuations in rainfall
determined output). Moreover households often have a foot in both rural and urban
économies. In the face of these analytical dificulties one must be reluctant to draw firm
général conclusions. Only detailed individuel country case studies can provide more
décisive answers.
• In setting out the requisites for 'good governance', the report rightly emphasizes the
essence of the rule of law and the enforcement of transaction contracts. Conformity to
formal rules - rather than reiiance on patron-client networks - should prevail. But
the report's trust that 'legal reform has become a priority in many countries' (p.71)
is overindulgent and naive wishful thinking.
• This naive approach is also manifest in the Bank's plea for a decentralized delivery of
human development services. Decentralized delivery Systems 'focusing on the local
Community and local school or health facility is key to effective service delivery'
(p.126). The basic idea is 'to get resources to where they are most needed and putting
them under control of the immédiate beneficiaries. This may include decentralization to
autonomous schools and health centers, and much greater reiiance on nongovernmental
organizations and other private organizations' (p.127). The assertion that 'genera!
political commitment to human development is already in place in most African
countries' (p. 124) is overoptimistic. Past expériences with local government and
district planning schemes (e.g. in Kenya) are far from encouraging. Local authorities
have often proved to be ineffective, corrupt and unresponsive to local needs. Moreover
it is unrealistic to expect highly centralized African governments to voluntarily
devolve power and funds to lower echelons of government and to autonomous community
institutions.
Donor pressure on African governments to seriously develop pro-poor policies (e.g.
within a debt cancelling scheme) might be more effective. However if one tends to agrée
with the Bank that 'conditionality has only been effective in bringing about lasting
reform when there has been a strong domestic movement of change' (p. 180), the donor
focus should then shift to assisting the rural poor to organize and empower themselves














• A final comment relates to Africa's future place in thé world economy. The report
states that 'to succeed in thé 21 st Century, Africa has to become a füll partner in thé
gobai economy1 (p.208). To enhance this intégration process thé Bank suggests a
strategy of diversifying Africa's exports and deepening régional intégration. Few would
disagree with thé Bank that Africa needs to diversify its production and export
structures. Africa's extremely high dependence on a few traditional primary exports
showing structural priée déclines on world markets is definitely a blind road.
Fortunately a number of countries with improved économie management show
encouraging growth in nontraditional agricultural exports (e.g. horticulture), labor-
intensive manufacturing and services (e.g. tourism).
But there is a need to temper the Bank's high expectations and prevent future
frustration because markets for these new products tend to be quickly saturated and
compétition from other developing régions, such as South-East Asia, is becoming even
fiercer.
Integration in the global economy might also offer less evident gains than expected. In
the last decade the strengthening of a few powerful regional trading bloes (NAFTA in
North America, AFTA in Asia and the enlarged European market) and the further
liberalization of international trade regimes under WTO guidance have presented
formidable threats to Africa's trade prospects. Given these new global realities it is
likely that Africa will quickly lose its EU tariff concessions now granted under the
'Lome Conventions'. Already the more productive and thus more compétitive Newly
Industrializing Countries (NIC's) in Asia are squeezing African exporters out of EU
markets. Some studies13 estimating the gains and losses emanating from further global
trade liberalization conclude that, with freer trade, Africa stands to löse not gain in
export revenues. This loss of export earnings is due mainly to preferential tariff
érosion. Other studies however calculate a global gain of $195 billion resulting from a
50% réduction in Worldwide trade restrictions. Developed countries capture the major
share of this gain (about $145 billion) and developing countries as a group could
expect to see their experts grow by roughly $50 billion, of which Africa would reap
only $2 billion, a modest 1% of the total global gain. If these estimâtes are correct,
Africa will be even more marginalized in thé global economy. Indeed the only option to
halt this dramatic trend is to form strong subregional economie groupings. There are
promising signs in Africa of a renewed commitment to the case of regional intégration
but expectations should not be overstressed. Ending protectionist policies in industrial
countries, for example the removal of the $300 billion subsidies to farmers of the
rieh OECD countries (which equals Africa's total GDP !), would make a big différence.
13 See Meilink, H & Konings, P.(1998) "Regional Economie Integration in sub-Saharan Africa", in :
Fernandez Jilberto, A. & Mommen, A. (eds.) Regionalization and Globalization in the Modern World
Economy, London: Routledge, pp. 128-146.
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Appendix A
REVIEW OF: WORLD BANK 2000, CANAFRICA CLAIM THE21ST CENTURY?
Deborah Fahy Bryceson
As the title suggests, Can Africa Claim the 21st Century is a policy rallying call for
economie reform on the African continent, the most recent in a long line of World Bank
policy review statements on African economie performance.14 This one, however,
comes at a time when the World Bank is itself in a défensive position. From both the
right and the left, the rôle of the World Bank in the global economy is being debated in
Washington's corridors of power and within the world's most powerful decision-
making circles.15 Over the past five years NGOs as well as some of the World Bank's
own non-economist staff have questioned the hegemonie position and neo-liberal
orthodoxy of World Bank economists (Fox 1998).16 The Seattle riots of November
1999 protesting the WTO's rôle in the globalisation process signalled the growing
awareness and unease of the genera! public about international financial institutions'
economie libéralisation policies.
The year 2000 has seen a considérable public relations effort on the part of the World
Bank to project itself as a champion of the needs of the poor.^ The World Bank's
President, James Wolfensohn, has personally invested time and effort in this charm
offensive, supporting a more open democratie forum for the exchange of views. To this
end an internet debate on the draft of the World Development Report 2000-01 was
conducted in February and March of this year. The outcome of this was more than the
World Bank's public relations advisers may have bargained for. Cyberspace saw an
avalanche of criticism against the World Bank's policies in developing countries,
particularly with respect to globalisation."'8
14 Year of publication and title of World Bank key policy documents related to Africa are: 1981,
Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa (commonly referred to as the Berg Report); 1984, Toward
Sustained Development in Sub-Saharan Africa; 1989, Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crises to Sustainable
Growth: A Long-Term Perspective; 1994, Adjustment in Africa: Reform, Results and the Road Ahead;
1995: Labour and the Growth Crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa.
1-* See various issues of The Economist for a review of the pressures the World Bank currently faces:
'Slimming the Bretton Woods Duo', 18/3/2000; The Bumpy Ride of Joe Stiglitz', 18/12/99
16 The recent departures of Professor Joe Stiglitz, the World Bank's chief economist, and Ravi Kanbur,
the éditer of the the 2000/01 World Development report from the staff of the World Bank reflect the
internai upheaval.
17 This is exemplified by an on-line World Bank site which states: 'The World Bank's mission is to fight
poverty with passion and professionalism for lasting results' (WDR 2000/1 Discussion,
wdr@lists.woTldbank.org, 21 February 2000).
18 Ravi Kanbur, as the editor of this WDR, resigned in protest against the'unreasonable pressure to tone
down WDR sections on globalisation'. ('Key World Bank Author Resigns', ID21 News Issue 16/6/2000;
'The Washington Dissensus', The Economist, 24 June 2000)
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The contents of the report under review are interesting in the context of growing
criticism of World Bank policies and the World Bank's counter attempts to project a
more sensitive approach to poverty. However, the main issue of concern in this
critique is how revealing and robust is the World Bank's analyses of the current
situation in Sub-Saharan Africa, and how realistic are its poiicy recommendations.
This review will provide brief summaries of the text in each chapter before critiquing
them, and concludes with général observations and comments about the overall report.
CHARTER 1: C AN AFRICA CLAIM THE 21ST CENTURY?
SUMMARYOFTEXT
This chapter provides a familiär overview of the continent's major developmental
Problems: its declining output per capita and share of world trade, rising income
inequality, rising morbidity and mortality and declining éducation services leading to
rising illiteracy. This is offset, it is argued, by Africa's enormous unexploited
Potentials and 'great scope for more effective use of its resources -public and private,
financial and human' (p.12).
Agency for effecting change is seen to depend on four main groups of domestic actors:
'civil society' (undefined), 'the poor and the excluded' (those with lack of access to
adequate income, services and essential infrastructure), 'producers' (those engaged in
business, agriculture and other sectors), and governments (African states and their
bureaucracies) (p.13). These groups must interact in a democratie way with a shift in
decision-making power amongst them to effect positive change and empowerment for
those who are currently marginalised. Donors are a fifth external group who must re-
evaluate their rôle.
Fast growth is essential to bring about a réduction in poverty. There are many hurdles
to surmount in its achievement: consumption per capita has to rise at the same time as
savings increase amidst high population growth. Seriously degraded infrastructure has
to be remedied and the continent has to be weaned from heavy aid dependence towards
greater participation in world trade. However, Africa's world trade is a major
stumbling block. Exports in all commodities with thé exception of fuel has declined
since 1970 (p.21).
Reasons for Africa's poor économie performance are briefly considered. While it is
granted that Africa faces an especially harsh environment and démographie
configuration this as well as thé continent's ethnie diversity and record on democracy
is as seen as both a symptom and a cause of its problems. The négative influence of war
and other social conflict is considered to be more serious than thé detrimental impact
of external trade shocks (p.25). Foreign aid is assumed to have hardly any effect on
growth. Basically, it is thé policies pursued by African governments that hâve
undermined their économies. As, with ail thé other abovecited World Bank reports,
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African governance and leadership is seen to be the major stumbling block, holding
back Investment in African people and causing the business environment to shoulder
high costs and risks making it unattractive to foreign investors. In effect, this World
Bank report sets up a scenario in which the 'government' is a counterforce to 'civil
society', 'the excluded' and 'the producers'. Donors, including the World Bank, are
posited as doing their best to foster the needs of the latter.
The World Bank argues that what economie reform that has taken place at its behest,
has helped to give national économies macroeconomic balance, opened up the continent
to market forces, and made room for private initiative. Nonetheless, this has not
effected thé degree of recovery hoped for. The reasons given for this disappointing
outcome consist of a wide assortment of ad-hoc factors noting first of all that Africa
was vulnérable to external market shocks and internai conflicts. In the late 1990s,
there were sharp déclines in commodity priées and throughout the decade war in
Central Africa, the Hörn and hotspots in West Africa dragged economie performance
down. Another set of factors relate to government's non-compliance or inconsistent
implementation of structural reform programmes. As in previous documents, the
World Bank does not hesitate to grade governments."19 Further there is a welter of
rationalisations pulled together under the obscure term 'hystérésis effects' which are
said to relate to on-going historical legacies that are not easily reversed. In fact under
this category, many of the detrimental outcomes of the reform programme that African
populations and World Bank critics have continually cited are admitted: the
undermining of civil service performance, the décline in service delivery, falling
incomes, loss of human capital in the public service, underfunding of sector ministries
and government programmes, over-reliance on external donor funding, piécemeal and
intrusive donor conditionality, lack of acceptance of SAP reforms by the African
population, and the undermining of governments' pre-SAP development agendas.
This report takes the occasion of a new millennium to assert that a 'fragile consensus
between Africa and its donors' has emerged. This consensus has toned down emphasis on
the market: 'Market-driven development could not succeed without strong social and
institutional infrastructure-including a strong and capable state-and without active
measures to alleviate sévère poverty and raise the capacity of the population.' (p.38)
The final section turns to how this 'fragile consensus' can forge an effective agenda for
the future and 'accelerated progress'. Harkening back to the notion of vicious versus
virtuous cycles of causation, the future, it is argued, dépends on addressing inter-
locking 'virtuous' cycles of: 1) improving governance and resolving conflict; 2)
19 It is mentiüned that 8 countries are 'judged to be on track' namely: Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana,
Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Uganda, and Zambia, although Ghana and Zambia were rebuked for 'lapses




investing in people; 3) increasing competitiveness and diversifying économies; and 4)
reducing aid dependence and debt and strengthening partnerships.
Conflict is seen as inversely correlated with economie reform arguing that countries
with better economie management have better participatory political Systems.
However, it is admitted that poverty, lack of employment and low éducation levels-
which many African people associate as outcomes of SAP programmes-can lead to
conflict.20
'Increasing competitiveness and diversifying économies' makes quick passing
référence to Africa's agriculture and natural resources, before turning to the
significance of Africa's high urban growth rate. It is acknowledged that 'urban
agglomération can have advantages', however, African urbanisation is proceeding
without rising incomes and the labour absorptive capacity of industrialisation.
Unemployment rates are high, not helped by public service retrenchment. Thus there
is a need for 'economie diversification' and 'export diversification'. The success of this
dépends on government forging trusting relationships with the business Community.
Finally, efforts towards 'reducing aid dependence and strengthening partnerships'
relate to the récognition that despite its many drawbacks and its sharp décline since the
mid-1990s, aid will continue to be essential for African development for some time to
come. High aid dependence holds back initiative and debt service drags down national
Potential. Yet, a serious brain drain makes assistance imperative. Donors have sought
to establish effective links with 'civil society' rather than government, but
accountability of NGOs is often.just as problematic as that of government. This créâtes
a serious impediment to thé effective delivery of aid. The aid economy has proliferated
causing fragmentation and duplication making integrated government budget
management impossible. Countries become 'cash poor and project rieh'. Donor flows
are estimated to be équivalent to half or more of countries fiscal revenues, financing
thé major portion of a country's social service and physical infrastructure. In thé long
run this has the effect of undermining rather than strengthening local capacity.
Critique
This overview chapter represents an eclectic mix of rationalisations as to why 20
years of economie reform has not generated thé hoped for économie well-being so
confidently promised during thé early stages of the World Bank's structural
adjustment offensive. The eclecticism and open-ended nature of this chapter suggests
that there are now no clear-cut solutions and that cause/effect relationships are
difficult to disentangle. The 'world market', always projected as thé solution to
" Zimbabwe is a récent example of a country whose Implementation of economie reform policies
beginning in thé early 1990s was associated with rising political tension.
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Africa's economie malaise is, admitted in passing, to be one of the 'external shocks'
causing economie setback.
There is a great deal of analytical fudging in this report. The text does not convey any
sense of African économies' overall structure. Policy recommendations are not
contextualised within some notion of an operational economie order. Development
économies in its heyday made its assessment of economie structure part of its analysis.
Thus, after independence in the 1960s, there was a 2-sector model, the modern
(urban) and the traditional (rural) sector,^"! which was displaced by a 3-sector
model in the 1970s: the formal (urban), informal (urban) and peasant (rural)
sector. These 3-sectors were overlaid by a functional catégorisation of: agriculture,
industry and services. Now however structural constructs of the economy seemed to
have been replaced with often overlapping actor catégories: 'government', 'civil
society', 'the poor', 'the producers', 'donors' and 'foreign investors'.
Recommendations are made with référence to these: 'government' should effect a
trusting relationship with businessmen ('producers'). 'Civil society' and 'donors'
should not undermine 'government' administration. And all actors should be more
attentive to 'the poor'. These facile normative directives suggest that it may be that it
is not only African économies that are in the vortex of a vicious cycle. The World Bank
may be entangled in its own rhetoric.
For roughly 20 years the World Bank has held up the torch of economie reform in
Sub-Saharan Africa. Over that space of time, African économies' participation in world
trade has been squeezed to an almost negligible amount, external debt has skyrocketed,
and poverty has escalated. Strangely, the World Bank's own rôle in these tendencies is
never raised. The World Bank is always assumed to be the voice of reason and rectitude.
In the recent open internet discussion on the draft World Development Report 2000-
01 on Poverty this stance was attacked:
...the Washington consensus policies and process are flawed...The WDR draft
however clearly acknowledges the failure of content and process. Here are some
significant sentences: "At the beginning of the 1990s...there seemed to be a
new, broad consensus - the 'Washington Consensus'. To many, free markets and
outward orientation had clearly proven themselves to be the most efficiënt way
for countries to grow and develop. Unfortunately, as in the past, events began to
undermine this certainty. Countries that adhered closely to the Washington
Consensus did not grow as predicted...some countries that went against the grain
of the consensus-notably in East Asia-did quite well. And with the global
economie crisis in the late 19990s came a new debate over the benefits and
costs of [world market] openness..." ...These quotes are important as they
See W.A. Lewis (1955), The Theory of Economie Growth, London, George Allan & Unwin.
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reflect a serious collapse of confidence in the policies that the Bank has pushed
together with the IMF through the years. This has serious implications. The
draft WDR talks of the failure in a detached way as if the Bank itself has not
been involved. But of course it has. Also, whilst it admits the policies did not
work, it does not admit the härm they did...(Contribution to WDR 2000/1
Discussion, wdr@lists.worldbank.org by Martin Knor, Director of the Third
World Network, 20/3/00).
Another commentator and co-author of one of the Voices of Poverty books observes:
What we call 'poverty' is a sélection of features from a nexus of social relations
in which we all participate. The Bank is engaged in these relations no less than
'the poor' it seeks to help. In some moments of the report...it would be easy to
come away with the impression that there is no such thing as the World Bank, or
that the WDR is some disinterested, ahistorical document, a survey of poverty
from space utterly disconnected from the history and policies (particularly
Structural Adjustment) that created the phenomena it documents. The discussion
in chapter 10 of the failure of the Washington Consensus is as close as the Bank
gets to acknowledging that it, too, is an actor with a great deal of influence in the
création of poverty. In a chapter that begins with the observation that 'the lives
of the poor depend to an increasing degree of forces originating outside their
borders' (para. 9.1), the omission of the Bank's own existence and influence is
odd...l am sceptical about whether it is possible, despite the laudable commitment
of the WDR and Poverty Réduction team to soliciting criticism, for the Bank to
acknowledge its implication in relations of power and still to continue to function
in the way it currently does. (Contribution to WDR 2000/1 Discussion by Raj
Patel, researching effect of libéralisation in Zimbabwe, Subject: [wdr]
International Power and Critiques From The Poor, 24 March, 2000).
Most succinctly one cybercorrespondent observed:
The Report is rather like an analysis of a shadow which ignores the object
casting the shadow, or a study of cow pats which never mentions cows. As many
have mentioned, reiationships between the rieh and poor worlds are understated
and therefore lead to inadequate policy options... (Contribution to WDR 2000/1
Discussion by Titus Alexander, author of Unravelling Global Apartheid, Subject:
[wdr] Comments on WEEK 1: Summary, 26 March, 2000).
The World Bank's increasing ability to set the development and research agenda in
Africa over the past two decades intimidated critics. Now however, protesting voices
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are emerging amongst donors, researchers and thé général public in thé West, whereas
thé dissent of thé African population, throughout these past 20 years has largely been
ignored with thé promise that 'thé economy will get better in time'. Nonetheless, the
tables appear to be turning, and the accountability of the World Bank, as Africa's main
policy-setting agency, is being questioned. In thé process thé World Bank is
backsliding, changing its position on a number of key issues that hâve underpinned its
economie reform policies. It is useful to briefly consider thèse issues and how and
possibly why thé World Bank's position has changed.
Can Sub-Saharan Africa's producers effective/y compote in thé global market?
Beginning with the 1981 Berg report, the fundamental assumption of structural
adjustment policies has been that African peasant farmers could not only compete, they
would benefit profoundly from liberalised markets.^2 The removal of parastatal
marketing and producer priée controls were believed to create better incentives to
produce as well as boost farmers' incomes. Furthermore, rural populations were seen
to gain relative to urban populations who were considered to hâve an undeserved
extractive relationship over peasant producers. Liberalised markets would destroy
'urban rents' of African government bureaucrats.
Now the World Bank's assumption about smallholder competitiveness has faded
away. Emphasis on the need to boost African exports leaves 'African exports' largely
unspecified. There is certainly no mention of African peasant response. They have
largely dropped out of thé équation. Also parallel to the vagueness of economie market
strategy, there is also an equivocal answer with regard to who benefits from
liberalised markets. Rather than poor peasants gaining, mounting évidence and NGO
pressure has led the World Bank to hedge on this by saying there are 'winners' and
'losers' in the short-term, although in the long-term market participation benefits
all. Essentially the World Bank's current emphasis on poverty alleviation is to shore
up the short-term losers who have lost income or livelihood by virtue of market
compétition and economie restructuring.
What has caused and is causing Africa's economie crisis?
The World Bank's answer to this question over the past two decades has remained
steadfast: African governments and their monopolistic, rent-seeking policies have been
consistently cited as the source of Africa's current crisis. In effect, Africa's crisis has
been portrayed as a crisis of leadership. In previous documents the World Bank
stressed the rôle of corrupt government administrations, but in this document,
22 These assumptions were stränge given that family farmers in Europe, North America and elsewhere
were adverse to liberalised markets.
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emphasis is simply on their earlier misguided policies and currently their inadequate
implementation and management capacities.
However, more than previous policy statements on Africa, this report has
acknowledged the rôle of the world market in causing 'external shocks' which generale
economie setbacks for African national économies. This observation is very much in
passing and is followed by exhortations for African économies to become more
economically diversified thereby immunising themselves from such shocks.
'Hystérésis effects' has been used as an obscure, catch-ail phrase to refer to all
sorts of demotivational and dislocational effects caused by the implementation of
structural adjustment. Thus, in this way, some of the critique of SAP is taken on board
without any admission of SAP's inadequacies.
Old and new logies of World Bank policy
Can Africa Claim the 21st Century? concèdes very little to World Bank critics. Unlike
the controversial World Development Report 2000-01 it does not identify SAP and
libéralisation policies with poverty expansion. Rather the causes of poverty expansion
are left entirely vague, part of an African condition, that seems unrelenting in its
growing hold on the continent.
There is, however, one area of SAP logic that seems to have been completely abandoned
in this document. The foundational 'urban bias' tenet of the SAP, as argued in the Berg
report has been removed without explanation. Phrases like 'urban agglomération can
have advantages' to signal the potentiality of urban growth in Africa if and when it
finds its bearings in the global market. One is left wondering why urban areas are now
viewed in such a favourable light. No longer caste as havens for rent-seeking African
government officials, cities are seen as vital nodes for the growth of entrepreneurial
business. Interestingly, the term 'informal sector' is not linked to this argument, and
is largely bypassed in contrast to past publications. This may be because the 'informal
sector' which now encompasses the major share of national commerce in most
countries is no longer sanctioned by donors. Whereas previously the entrepreneurial
spirit of the informal sector was juxtaposed to the plodding inefficiency of government
parastatals and ministries, now the informal sector's tax-evading character has
marked it. Donors, led by the World Bank, are now retreating from extreme anti-
government positions and being more supportive of African governments' onerous
tasks of tax collection.
There is finally one other unstated reason why eliminating 'urban bias' is no longer a
World Bank policy objective. Quietly, and without any explanation, over the past
decade, Africa's smallholders and their export capability has been jettisoned. Rural
smallholders were viewed as the victims of 'urban bias'. Now that they are no longer a
policy focus, 'urban bias' ceases to be a problem.
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It seems certain catégories of 'producers', even if they constitute the bulk of the
population, namely smallholders, are expendable. They are transferred to the ranks of
'the poor' where their welfare cause can be taken up under the banner of 'investing in
people'.
CHARTER 4: INVESTING IN PEOPLE
Summary of Text
This chapter reviews what is termed 'the current human development crisis' that must
be resolved for Africa 'to claim the 21st Century', given that: 1) economie trends in
the 21s* Century are geared to ever more reliance on labour skills rather than natural
resources; and 2) 'investing in people' gives them the means and the motivation to lift
themselves out of poverty. The resolution of the crisis lies on decentralising service
delivery of health and educational services, by becoming more poverty-focussed, and
by relying more heavily on international coopération in the form of the Heavily
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative.
It is acknowledged that over the course of the 1960s and 1970s, Africa's
human development indicators had been improving, but they starled to stagnate or even
décline over the past two decades. The dimensions of the crisis are staggering whether
one compares African welfare against other continents or looks at it temporally over
time. Africa is the only continent where primary school enrolment rates actually
declined between 1980 and 1995 (p.105). Secondary and tertiary éducation levels are
exceptionally low. Those actually attending school face very poor éducation standards
and abysmal teaching facilities.
On the health front, the situation seems even worse. The steady improvement in
nutrition and infant mortality rates has been reversed. The bürden of infectious disease
has risen inexorably as funding for public health facilities disintegrated. Current
deaths from HIV/AIDS is considered to be the proverbial 'tip of the iceberg'.
Improvements in life expectancy has stagnated since 1990. In its wake, AIDS has
brought vast numbers of orphans. AIDS is seen to be exacerbated by high rates of
urbanisation and civil war. 'Investing in people' is a phrase related to the need to
address the devastating health crisis, especially AIDS. The long hoped-for drop in
Africa's high population growth rates is tragically associated with the impact of AIDS.
The report poses the question of why this human development crisis has occurred,
asking five rhetorical questions: Do Africans value investments in human
development? Are resources used efficiently? Are African governments committed to
human development? Are service delivery mechanisms appropriate? Is there enough
international coopération?
All of these questions are answered in light of neo-classical economie studies
returns on Investment. Africans are found to be eager to invest even at low levels of
l
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income but income constraints lead to public, rather than private, health and éducation
services becoming increasingly more focussed on the poor. Evidence suggests that the
coping capacity traditional extended family supports of many rural people has been
undermined and has negatively affected school attendance.
The report assesses that resources for addressing the crisis vary a great deal
from country to country, being overall quite limited, yet it is argued that the
efficiency of utilising this capacity leaves considérable room for irnprovement. It is
believed that governments are willing to address the problem and attempt to improve
social service provisioning but there is a lot of vested interests in their way, e.g. trade
unions, student organisations, etc. The sheer size of the social service need makes the
task enormously daunting. Part of the problem is governments' centralised service
provisioning. There is a need to décentralise management of health and éducation
services, which is tune with démocratisation. International coopération should be
extended, with a suggested division of labour in which African countries endeavour to
fill knowledge gaps and OECD partners take responsibility for finance and research on
how to best provision health and éducation requirements.
The report then goes on to set five goals by 2015, namely: 1) the achievement
of universal primary éducation; 2) the élimination of gender disparities in éducation
(by 2005); 3) the réduction of infant and child mortality by two-thirds; 4) réduction
of maternai mortality by three-quarters; and 5) achievement of universal access to
reproductive health services. These goals are seen to be reasonable but not easy to
achieve given the déclines of the last two decades. Their achievement will require
service delivery innovations. A re-evaluation of the effectiveness of user-fees may be
needed, particularly with regard to school attendance. Different forms of revenue
génération may be needed. The extra resources of the HIPC initiative will provide a
vital boost. In some cases, African government's commitment to controversial public
health issues such as AIDS has to be resolved to save lives. On the other hand,
government's actually involvement in service delivery is not critical. Effective
delivery is seen to lie in stronger Community and private institutions based on
principles of decentralised delivery. Governments however should retain a rôle in
cohérent public budgeting as well as compensating for geographical unevenness in
service delivery.
Critique
Chapter 4 was probably thé easiest chapter to write and seemingly the least
controversial but it is surely the most evasive. The impact of structural adjustment
policies on Africa's social service infrastructure is entirely circumvented.
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International NGOs like Oxfam^S have been campaigning for a number of years to draw
attention to thé systemic run-down of social services connected with thé
Implementation of SAP in Sub-Saharan Africa. African urban and rural populations
have seen the infrastructure and staffing of such services, painstakingly fostered from
indépendance, disintegrate under ever increasing financial constraints. Meanwhile,
user fées hâve often served to marginalise the poor from using what facilities that
continue to exist. In other words, there is little doubt in the minds of the African
populace and most international NGO agencies that the World Bank-enforced policies of
the last 20 years have engendered the avalanche of educational deprivation and disease
now being experienced in Africa. Yet this report does not allude to this widely held
opinion. Yet, the closest the World Bank cornes to acknowledging adverse effects of its
policies is mention of the possible constraining effect of user fées on the poor's use of
health and éducation facilities. The report calls for more research to investigate this.
The air of unreality that permeates this chapter is demonstrated by the
incredibly ambitious goals it sets for achievement in the year 2015 in the fields of
public health and mass éducation. It seems incredulous that a document which offers
very little in the way of sectoral reform in the sphère of social services other than a
vague call for 'décentralisation' and reliance on private and community initiative can
then déclare fantastic goals of: universal primary éducation, cutting infant mortality
and maternai mortality by 66 and 75 per cent respectively, and universal access to
family planning services.
In the report, the réalisation of these goals are seen to depend largely on donor
assistance, notably the HIPC initiative. Given the recent G8 Summit in Japan revealed
world powers who were less than eager to deliver quickly on earlier eve-of-the-
millennium promises for debt relief at its earlier Cologne Summit, these goals seem
all the more unachievable. As of July 2000, only nine countries were on course for
US$15 bn in debt relief compared with the earlier pledge that 40 countries would
receive US$105 bn.24
Besides mention of the possible negative impact of user fees, the report does not
address why the 'human development crisis' erupted in the 1980s and escalated out of
control in the 1990s. lts coïncidence with the Implementation with SAP is blithely
ignored. Recent DGIS-funded research on deagrarianisation at the Afrika-
23 Oxfam has been particularly active in documenting the serious under-funding of African countries'
health and éducation sectors.
24 With référence to the Japanese Summit's diversionary déclaration to support the supply of computer
infrastructure and know-how to the world's poor, a London Sunday Times editorial (23/7/00) entitled
'Give them Short shrift' retorts: 'The Third World is not starving for want of internet access. The price of
a decent laptöp" computer would pay for 2,000 child vaccinations against killer diseases. Déclarations
about the need of poor countries to "leapfrog conventional obstacles to infrastructure development" are
close to an insult. Ann Pettifor, Director of Jubilee 2000 UK, commented: 'The poor can't eat cyber-
cake." ('Britain leads G8 into war on drug barons', London Sunday Times 23/7/2000).
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Studiecentrum involving African research teams in Ethiopia, Tanzania, Nigeria and
South Africa suggest that declining school enrolments are related to the widespread
phenomenon of household income diversification. In rural areas, declining returns to
agricultural cash erop production has led to a scramble for income-generating
activities not only on the part of male heads of households, but particularly women, and
many children as well. In other words, children's earnings have become vital to
economie survival in many households.2^
There are further spillover effects of the 'scramble for cash'. The intensification of
the female working day with the addition of cash-earning activities means women tend
to be away from the home more, or otherwise occupied with market-focussed work as
opposed to childcare and cooking. Children's nutritional status and health may suffer.
In addition, survey work in several rural areas of this research programme point to
the .growing importance of alcohol production, particularly distilled drinks as opposed
to brewed beer, as a ready form of income-earning, which helps dispose of erop
surpluses that are otherwise not profitably marketed.26 Alcohol producers have a
burgeoning market despite or perhaps because of the economie recession. As elsewhere
in the world, alcohol abuse is particularly acute in many poor populations and can
assuage a sense of démoralisation and hopelessness. Alcohol's possible link to the AIDS
epidemie cannot be ignored. A heavy drinking culture is particularly entrenched in
Southern Africa (South Africa, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Namibia and Zambia) where the
AIDS epidemie is currently most concentrated.
Chapter 6: Spurring Agricultural and Rural Development
Summary of Text
This chapter begins on a dire note with the observation that African agriculture is
uncompetitive. African farmers and agroindustrialists have suffered from a lack of
favourable incentives and institutional supports. However in Pollyanna fashion it is
argued that this enhances Africa's agriculture potential since it is considered largely
untapped. - 'good reason for optimism' (p. 170).
Investment in agriculture is seen as an important way to address poverty. Efforts to
achieve food security and gain competitiveness in the world market could enhance the
welfare of a large segment of the African population since agriculture accounts for: 35
25 Overview documents of the research programmes findings are: Bryceson, D.F. 2000, 'Rural Africa at
the Crossroads: Rural Livelihood Practices and Policies', ODI Natural Resources Perspectives Briefing
Sheet, no. 52, April 2000, 6 pp; Bryceson, D.F. 1999, Sub-Saharan Africa Betwixt and Between: Rural
Livelihood Practices and Policies, Leiden, Africa-Studiecentrum, DARE Working Paper vol 43, 73 pp.
26 See Pietelä, T. forthcoming 2001 'Drinking Mothers Feeding Children: Market Women and Gender
Politics in Kilimanjaro, Tanzania'; Tanzarn, N.B. 2001 forthcoming, 'Liquid Gold of a Lost Kingdom:
The Rise of Waragi Production in Kibaale District, Uganda'; Teilegen, N. 2001 forthcoming, 'Work and
Play: Brewersünd Drinkers in the Malawian Village Economy'; and van der Drift 2001 forthcoming,
'Democracy's Heady Brew: Cashew Wine and the Authority of the Elders among the Balanta in Guinea
Bissau' in Bryceson, D.F. and N. Tellegen (eds) Africa through the Drinking Glass: Mixing Alcohol with
Business, Pleasure and Politics, forthcoming.
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per cent of the region's GDP, 70 per cent of its employment and 40 per cent of its
exports. Furthermore, such Investment could strengthen backward and forward
linkages between agriculture and other sectors of the domestic economy.
Reasons for Africa's poor agricultural performance are familiär: high transaction
costs, inadequate market infrastructure, weak supporting institutions, and limited
vertical intégration (p. 172). These are seen to be the product of centuries rather than
decades of heavy extraction and taxation by ruling elites. In the most recent post-
independence period this took the form of urban bias in services and priées. Africa's
huge geographical expanse, its low population density and endémie disease of animal and
human populations have not helped. Nonetheless bad policies rather than low
endowments are seen as the prime factors holding back African agriculture. The basic
problem is that African producers have not enjoyed sufficient market incentives to
produce. Policies mounted by African governments to encourage smallholders to
produce for the market, such as fertiliser subsidies, were monopolised by rural élites.
Sparsely populated smallholder populations hâve not had a sufficient political voice.
Thus, démocratisation is seen as an important step forward in encouraging local
organisations of the poor.
A section on assessing thé impact of agricultural policy reforms over the past 20 years
asserts that thé agricultural sector's competitiveness has improved although 'thé
effected on capitalization of agriculture and rural areas has been limited' (p.181). The
élimination of exchange rate overvaluations has helped but weak institutions still pose
a barrier to Investor confidence, and élimination of priée controls remains incomplète
in some countries. Export crop policies like thé movement of domestic producer priées
to border parity levels and the removal of state marketing boards and priée
stabilisation funds has been positive, but declining world market commodity priées
hâve detracted from thé gains. In many countries, private traders hâve not yet
succeeded in lowering transaction costs, suggesting that reforms need to be Consolidated
(p.184).
It is argued that the long-term secular décline in Africa's major agricultural exports
nécessitâtes diversification into other commodities that can be produced with new
technology at lower costs. World market priées fluctuate and care must be taken to
grab the opportunités afforded by peaks as and when thé occurred.
The libéralisation of staple food erop markets, notably that of maize in East and
Southern Africa, has been followed by thé tendency for farmers' producer priées and
urban consumer priées to décline making urban consumers thé major beneficiary. This
is explained by the fact that high marketing board margins have been eliminated for thé
consumer _and grain trading is highly compétitive (p. 186). It is observed that the
combination of lower producer priées and thé removal of fertiliser subsidies has
strong disincentive effects on smallholding farmers and could jeopardise régional food
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security. Thus food production policies must be improved by raising productivity as
well as lowering thé costs of grain importation. On raising productivity, it is
recognised that thé removal of fertiliser subsidies often caused abandonment of
fertiliser usage, and was often not properly sequenced in the policy reform process.
The private sector has not become activeiy involved in fertiliser distribution which
requires policy attention.
It is noted that progress on agricultural pricing reform has superseded progress on
lifting institutional and infrastructural constraints. Donors have typically contributed
roughly 40 per cent of agricultural research costs and there is need to invest more in
this area which promises high returns on Investment. It is claimed that land and labour
productivity in agriculture has risen during thé 1980s and first half of the 1990s.
Yet.iAfrica has lost significant market share in many of its main agricultural exports
since 1970, e.g.: groundnuts (55 per cent), cocoa (27 per cent), coffee (14 per cent)
but has made small increases during thé early 1990s in bananas, cotton, sugar, tea and
tobacco.
The report advocates the adoption of a 'business plan in thé 21s* Century' to make
agriculture and agroindustry more productive. There is a need to consolidate thé
reform process and encourage private agents' entry into input, output and rural
financial markets. All stakeholders should be consulted as emphasised by thé
Organisation of African Unity. The capitalisation of African agriculture requires
enormous Investment that will involve both private and public sectors in 'on-farm,
agroindustrial, and infrastructure investments' (p.194). Women should be included in
thé process. Investments should guard against environmental dégradation.
Furthermore, thé HIV/AIDS crisis adds another dimension to thé Investment scenario,
lowering labour productivity and increasing dependency ratios.
The resources for this investment drive must be garnered amidst declining foreign aid,
poorly developed rural financial markets, and over-extended central and local
government funding commitments. Thus, most of the investment will 'corne from rural
incomes' (p.198). Rural income sources include rural population's savings,
entrepreneurs, cost recovery for services, taxes levied by local and central
government and foreign direct investment. AH this dépends on making agriculture
dynamic and profitable. Thus institutional reforms to improve input and output
markets, Africa's better access to OECD markets, land tenure reform, are all
necessary to boost agricultural exports. To this end, implicit taxation on agriculture
should be reduced, public-private partnerships should be activeiy encouraged and
donors should increase aid especially to agricultural research.
Despite emphasis on the increasing rôle of private capital in developing African
agriculture, public investment will continue to be critical. Efforts have to be made to




décentralisation of resources and responsibilities which requires strengthening local
government. Success dépends on efforts to improve marketing by removal of remaining
barriers to transport and trade and seeking regional approaches to research and
development.
Critique
This chapter perhaps more than any other marks a break with past World Bank policy
statement documents which posited African smallholder agriculture as the 'engine of
growth' for the continent. By contrast, the first sentence of this chapter reads:
'Centuries of poor policies and institutional failures are the primary cause of Africa's
undercapitalized and uncompetitive agriculture' (p. 170) Thus, the World Bank
belatedly admits that pitting undercapitalised peasants against highly capitalised
agroindustrial interests in the world market is problematic. If European and North
American family farmers are struggling to compete, how can their African
counterparts with far less sophisticated technology and exceptionally high transport
costs succeed where they have failing?27 This sentence also radically départs with
previous SAP thinking by blaming the under-performance of African agriculture on
centuries of poor policies. It seems Africa's post-independence policy-makers now
have Company - European slave traders, colonial governments, plantation owners and
settlers are all now implicated. African agriculture can't compete because of its long
legacy of under-investment.
Having asserted Africa's lack of competitiveness at the outset, the major share
of the chapter is devoted to covering up the devastating effect SAP and economie
libéralisation has had on Africa's peasant smallholders. This is accomplished by never
distinguishing different types of agricultural producers and their respective scales of
production. Hence the word 'smallholder' has been jettisoned.28 'Agriculture' which
seems to vaguely refer to smallholders and 'agroindustry' denoting larger-scale
capitalised producers are often lumped together in the analysis, without comment. In
this way, claims like 'Recent reforms have improved agricultural priée incentives'
(p. 187), can be ambiguously understood as large-scale agroindustrialists have
responded to priée incentives.
Most indications are that reforms had the opposite effect on smallholding
peasants. As findings of the ASC's Deagrarianisation and Rural Employment (DARE)
research programme show: SAPs largely dismantled parastatal marketing boards that
27 por further discussion of this see Bryceson, D.F. 2000, 'Disappearing Peasantries? Rural Labour
Redundancy in the Neo-Liberal Era and Beyond', in Bryceson, D.F., C. Kay and J. Mooij (eds),
Disappearing Peasantries? Rural Labour in Africa, Asia and Latin America, London, Intermediate
Technology Publications
2° Similarly, during the 1970s and early 1980s, the World Bank and other IFIs jettisoned the term
'peasant' in favour of the more politically neutral term 'smallholder'. See Bryceson, D.F. 2000, 'Peasant
Theories and Smallholder Policies: Past and Present' in Bryceson, Kay and Mooij (eds).
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had services peasants' input requirements, enforced commodity standards, and
provided single-channel marketing facilities and controlled prices. Their replacement
by private traders was patchy, and left smallscaie peasant farmers with a more
uncertain market environment, widely fluctuating producer prices, rocketing input
prices and tenuous input supply. At the same time as returns from peasants'
commercial agriculture became less certain, daily cash requirements were increasing
under the economie stringency of SAPs. Peasant farmers reacted by trying to diversify
their incomes. A surge in non-agricultural income sources is one of the most striking
economie outcomes of SAP in rural Africa, which this World Bank report never
mentions (see DARE research reports denoted with an asterisk in bibliography).
This chapter does acknowledge the loss of market share for some of Africa's
major agricultural experts during the SAP years. Also it documents the tendency for
grain producer prices and urban consumer prices to décline within the liberalised
markets (p. 186). This is very perverse outcome given the World Bank's original
stated intention to reduce 'urban bias' in line with the analysis of the Berg Report of
1981 and Bates (1980). It was argued that government staple food marketing boards
and parastatals were buying peasant food crops at artificially low controlled prices for
the benefit of urban consumers. SAP was implemented in the name of improving
peasant producer prices. Yet, now, after several years of private grain trading,
farmers' producer prices are so low that many see no point in producing grain for the
market and urban consumers are enjoying exceptionally low staple food prices. As
noted above, the World Bank perceives a consequent food security risk and recommends
more libéralisation of food importation. This measure could undermine peasant farmer
commercial grain farming altogether. Could that be the long range goal of the Bank? It
certainly seems so, in the absence of any explanation to the contrary.
Strangely, there is scant mention of the rôle of non-traditional export crops,
especially horticultural products, which throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s
was one of the World Bank's main stratégies for reviving African agriculture. This
strategy seems to have fallen by the wayside, perhaps because it was largely irrelevant
to the majority of peasant producers who did not have the technological or transport
capacity to produce horticultural products according to strict delivery schedules. The
report notes that, in any case, relative prices for nontraditional export crops have
declined although at a slower than that for Africa's traditional exports (p. 203).
Chapter 6's exhortations for improvements to marketing, agricultural research in the
face of contracting financial means for agricultural infrastructure provisioning leaves
the reader with the impression that this chapter is written on auto-pilot. There is no
mention, let alone conviction, that peasant smallholders have market niches or
Windows of opportunity for innovation. And there is silence about their efforts to do
something else, rural households' attempts to diversify into non-agricultural
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activities. The process of marginalisation of peasants and their flight from agriculture
into Iow paid informal sector is simply ignored in this report.
Conclusion
This document represents an institutional face-saving effort on the part of the World
Bank. In the face of the dire effects of SAP and market libéralisation on the living
standards of the African population, the report postures with an expressed concern for
the poor. The economie prospects of African peasant farmers are cavalierly written off
and the options for the millions of undercapitalised 'diversifiers' struggling to make
ends meet in the so-called 'informal sector' are papered over with vague calls to
support the private sector. Throughout the document there is no effort to differentiate
undercapitalised low-income economie agents as opposed their much more endowed
high income counterparts. 'Agriculture' (meaning smallholders) and 'agroindustry'
(meaning local and foreign investors) are often lumped together, without any
récognition of any interest conflict between them.
The hegemonie position of the World Bank, supported by bi-lateral donors over the
course of the last two decades, has left a deep scar on social and physical science
research on Africa. Research priorities have been entirely dominated by World Bank
frames of référence, terminology and objectives. In the process, it has been very
difficult for opposing findings and views to be heard, let alone accepted. Now, the World
Bank's analytical perspective is not only clouded by ideological dogma but institutional
defensiveness as well. In a sense, this document represents the culmination of years of
neglect of rigorous macro-level research on trends and tendencies on the African
continent. As always, the authors of the document rely most heavily on other World
Bank documents, allowing them to remain smugly oblivious to different interprétations
- the 'hystérésis effect' of World Bank domination.
This is an irresponsible document whose main policy recommendation is
essentially more of the same but with a slightly more humanitarian gloss. Certainly
the African continent deserve more than this self-serving cover-up of the
effectiveness of policies the World Bank enforced in Sub-Saharan Africa over the last
two decades. The current crisis requires in-depth considération of real policy options,
not just a hastily constructed humanitarian concern for thé poor.
The 'poor' are no longer marginal, they are the majority of the population.
Humanitarian welfare-focussed drives to improve health and éducation in thé absence
of économie policies to address agrarian labour redundancy and basic needs will cause
thé prolifération not the contraction of their numbers. Future viable livelihood
prospects for Africa's displaced peasantries and those peopling thé continent's ever-
growing amorphous informai sector, must be found and fostered now. Otherwise, thé
continent is bound to see war and misery on an as yet unprecedented scale.
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Some comments on Can Africa claim the 21st Century?
Jan .Abbink
1. Importance
The World Bank has produced its agenda on (Sub-Sahara) Africa in the new Century
under the title Can Africa Claim the 21st Century (Washington DC, 2000). This
document, produced after numerous seminars, forums and discussions by a wide
collective of scholars, is an important one:
* the World Bank (WB), together wit the International Monetary Fund (IMF), has had
a crucial external impact on economie and social development in Africa in the past
quarter-century.
* many scholars from across the world from a variety of institutions, including from
African countries, have critically commented on draft chapters. It has not only been
conceived and written at the desks in Washington, DC.
* it gives examples of many development aid projects which have been successful,
either carried out by the WB or by international and local NGOs and development
agencies. These examples demonstrate the fact that not only macro-economie policies
are important but that the private and public efforts of committed (often foreign)
development agencies and experts can be vital engines of positive change.
For these reasons alone the message deserves close scrutiny. The brief comments given
below refer to Chapters 1-4 and 8.
2. Scope and approach
What strikes the reader is the comprehensive view and ambitious scope of the report:
the narrative touches on many major economie and developmental factors that impinge
upon Africa and explain its long period of crisis. Answers are sought to the question of
why Africa 'lagged behind', and why promising developments in the 1960s and 1970s
were not sustained in the last decade of the 20th Century. The perspective is economie;
social and political factors in African countries are secondary in the analysis.
The ambitious scope of the report has led to fairly high level of generalization and a
highly prescriptive tone: there is a very large number of "ought", "should" and "need
to"-clauses, demanding an almost impossible agenda of 'major changes' for Sub-
Sahara Africa. Moreover, this agenda of change is tied to current insights of the World
Bank only,_and does not openly reflect the controversy both in - and outside the Bank
(and its associated institutions, like International Development Agency (IDA) and IMF)
about the course Africa has to take, and more importantly, about the policy initiatives
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that the developed world and the donor countries/institutions could take. Neither is
there much évaluation of past performance of the WB in Africa itself (virtually
nothing on the impact of its Structural Adjustment Programmes, SAPs), of its policies
toward agriculture or toward African governance). tessons from several internally
produced critical studies are not explicitly discussed either.
Notable also is that the report's empirical data and analyses are virtually all
based on 'in-house' sources: other economically oriented World Bank research
reports. Independent research (let alone contemporary-historical, sociological and
anthropological studies with economie relevance) of non-WB origin are largely
bypassed. In an account with a largely economie perspective, this is perhaps
understandable. But as the report repeatedly calls for a 'holistic' approach and also
extensively comments upon politics (strengthening of state capacity, good governance)
and society (health care, éducation), a broader, more context-sensitive view of more
relevant data on African societies is ultimately called for (especially when dealing
with the individual countries). In addition, critical studies of WB programmes and
projects are not much cited either. Although conclusions from such debates have been
dealt with and were often, in some way, adopted in WB thinking*^, there are few
références or acknowledgements to scholarly work done outside the WB framework. If
suggestions of non-WB literature are taken in, they are not traceable in the list of
références.
3. The message in brief
The rhetorical question in the title is answered by a cautious and conditional "yes".
The facts about Africa, however, are not encouraging. To meet the internationally
agreed upon development aims for 2015, where the réduction of poverty is perhaps
the core aim, African économies have to grow (in GDP) by at least 7% annually to
reduce mass poverty by half. A minimum of 5% growth annually is needed not to let the
number of poor r/se. In view of the rate of the past 15 years, this is a high aim to set.
The World Bank's contention, however, is that it is in principle possible, as it was for
Asia (Asia in the early 1960s was economically worse off than Africa).
For the positive turn to happen, African countries need to implement new WB
policy programs, and need "business plans", to be made by local governments with the
donor community. The aims should be to reduce poverty, combat persistent health
Problems (AIDS, malaria, a.o.), broaden éducation and improve its efficiency, invest
in transport and communications infrastructure, enhance employment and economie
output, strengthen the capacity and efficiency of African governments/states, keep
29 For one bnef analysis, see S.P. Schatz, "The World Bank's fundamental misconception in Africa", in
Journal of Modern African Studies 34(2), 1996, pp. 239-47. The main idea of this article is that not
government performance but the structural features of African économies themselves are the chief
problem. This critique has, however, been incorporated into WB thinking.
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track of environmental problems, and improve the delivery and effectiveness of
international development aid. Aid dependency should be discouraged. But aid remains a
necessity for most African countries in view of the low domestic savings rate, the
narrow tax base of national économies, low consumption, low direct (external or local
private) Investment, low productivity and underdeveloped export capacity, and balance
of payment problems.
Emphasis is put on decisively enhancing the performance of African
governments (good governance, improving efficiency, commitment), as their bad
administrative and governing record is seen by the WB (already since the early
1980s) as one of the major causes of poor economie performance.
Africa's position on the world market remains fragile and vulnérable: terms of
trade have deteriorated, exports are not diversified enough and are vulnérable to price
movements on the world markets for prime commodities, and Africa's share in world
trade is declining. This vulnerability is linked to a combination of (comparatively
unfavourable) climatic-geographic factors, the héritage of political and economie
problems of a colonial and postcolonial nature (including weakly institutionalized
states, infrastructural barriers, undercapitalized agriculture and industry), and
conflict (cf. Ch. 2).30 Especially since 1997, Africa is in a 'growth crisis' and
decisively lags behind.
Reducing poverty continues to stand out as the major emphasis of WB policy as
proposed in this report. Higher levels of wealth lead to more spending, more
consumption, and more 'stakes' of people in their country's economy. Also, major
investments should be made in people (Ch. 4): in éducation and in health. Whether this
more humanitarian emphasis will indeed be carried out and sustained in the spécifie
WB/IMF country assistance programs remains to be seen.31
4. The diagnosis
Much of the WB report's diagnosis is usefui in the sense that all major relevant
<Y^
factors in Africa's politico-économie problems are considered and new linkages
identified. The new call made for comprehensive, holistic development, with a strong
emphasis on integrated country implementation plans, is timely and necessary.
3() An important conclusion is that WB research by P. Collier et al. has disproved the factor of 'ethnie
diversity' of states as a cause of conflict; the opposite tends to be the case, certainly in more democratie
countries. I.e., other social and economie factors precipitate conflict, which then become embroiled in
ethnie strife later on (pp. 24-25, 56). This is what many anthropologists and contemporary historians of
Africa have Been saying in the last 20 years on the basis of their data.
31 It will depend on good local research on the expérience and nature of 'poverty', not only in an
economie but also in a socio-cultural sense. E.g., if économie 'development' leads to more dependence
and loss of Community control - compare pastoralists -, people's lives will not improve.
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Chapter 1
The général Chapter 1, "Can African claim the 21 st Century", gives not an
analysis but an overview of African development Problems. While "much has changea"
and improved compared to a Century ago (e.g. in literacy, life expectancy, political
participation), thé challenges now are "enormous". The message tries to be one of
hope, but often its too optimist, "win-win" language is not realistic and seems to
become mainly pep-talk.
Mentioned as worrying developments are: Africa's declining share in world
trade (an 'income loss' of $ 68 billion in 1970-1993), its declining savings and
Investment rates per capita, its high income inequality, and its currently poor human
endowments (in éducation and health) and social exclusion, insecurity and conflict, and
the disastrous impact of new health problems like the HIV/AIDS pandémie, which is
estimated to take away at least 1-2% of GDP (p. 237).
Positive points noted are: achievement of macro-economie balancing of many state
budgets, more scope for market forces (also less protectionism), for private
initiative, and for privatization. Despite this, there has been no persistent or durable
economie growth.
Prerequisites for change are "determined leadership" ( p. 11), building on
past democratization, and economie empowerment (p. 13). Among the latter heading,
four groups are mentioned as beneficiaries-to-be: civil society; the poor and excluded;
producers; and governments. This, incidentally, means: virtually everybody in any
African country. So the spécifies and priorities are somewhat lost here.
In this chapter (under a heading called 'The bottom line", p. 27) a plea is made
for sound policies and strong local institutions in Africa. In underlining this element,
the report conveniently omits the fact that the SAPs of the 1980s and 1990 insisted on
the opposite: reducing the rôle of the (hypertrophied) state and enhancing private
agents and market forces to 'liberale the economy'. This led to some macro-economie
improvements but also to blight in the social service sector, health care and éducation,
state institutional structures, to a loss of trained personnel and staff (i.e. 'capacity')
from the state, and to a genera! undermining of public trust in, and legitimacy of, the
African state. The report could here at least have given a measured assessment of the
impact of SAPs on African society. That more or less successful macro-economie
adjustments have been made (p. 28-29) hides the fact that problems caused by this
process may come bouncing back at an even greater cost (e.g., ignoring of the spread of
HIV/AIDS in many countries in the early 1990s).
Despite the sombre economie profile of Africa, the report sees a "window of
opportunityl in three trends (p. 46):
* political opening: there is more political participation and more pressure for
accountability.
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What is ignored is that the trend is reversible, and is often compromised by the
ambivalent policies of donor countries in their relations with African countries.
* end of the Gold War: global political bloc rivalry has ended and this may lead to more
consensus on development needs and effectiveness.
However, political power play in Africa is not gone (e.g., EU vs. USA and Islamic
countries vs. the West), and new regional conflicts have erupted. This should be
realistically acknowledged.
* Globalization and the new technology: the report states that the opportunities are
great and that huge gains may be in the offing.
But elsewhere it is said that the communications and other infrastructures are still so
inadequate in Africa, that it is doubtful that they will be a comparative advantage
allowing the continent to catch up.
In sum, the message of hope in this chapter is admirable in the face of the
distressing facts, and the analysis présents most of the relevant issues. But the
optimism is perhaps too much. Too much is laid at doorstep of African countries and
their governments, and too little self-critique of donor institutions and countries is
given.
Ultimately, much of the causal links remain unclear as well. Indeed the chapter speaks
of four circles of (cumulative) causation (p. 39): circle 1, improving governance and
resolving conflict; circle 2, improving competitiveness and diversifying économies;
circle 3, investing in people; and circle 4, reducing debt aid dependence and debt and
strengthening partnership. That the circles are inextricably linked is obvious, but
what they imply for policy priorities is not quite clear.
Chapter 2 ^
it is significant that Chapter 2 deals with "Improving Governance,
Managing Conflict and Rebuilding States": reflecting an old adage of the WB
that African leadership is sub-standard and non-performing, and thus having a
deleterious effect on economie performance. While this views is often shared by
African populations, which by and large do not trust their governments (and often fear
them), it is no longer convincing to put the chief blame on them. The real economie
difficultés of Africa in terms of production factor endowments, héritage of the past
(including colonial mismanagement, lack of infrastructure and of economie
diversification, and authoritarianism) and practices of the developed world vis-à-vis
the ex-colonial world (e.g., tariffs and own market protection) still cannot be
underestimated.
However, the report is right in emphasizing the rôle of enhancing democratie
structures, rule-of-law institutions, and developing constitutional-representative
institutions. These are ideals shared by the large majority of the Africans and were the
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aim of mass struggle since the late 1980s. 32Whether, however, in the spécifie
country assistance programs the WB and IMF keep these (political) aims in mind over
and above the economie ones is not at all sure. CAS reports usually focus on économies
only, and not on political recovery, etc.
The report states that rapid changes have occurred in Africa's political
landscape, creating "opportunities for development and growth". But the reverse could
also be said. Instability and insecurity can be given new leases of life if African states
fails to deliver on participatory, democratie structures and equity. How committed
donor country support for processes of political reform will be seems far from clear.
There is also a divergence of views of WB with those of others as to the democratie and
policy reform commitments of leaders. A blatant mistake of the international donor
Community was to put excessive trust in the Ethiopian, and especially the Eritrean,
post-1991 leadership as a "new brand of leaders" (as they were amenable to SAPs,
reducing central state économies, liberalizing markets, etc.). But those same leaders
had no qualms in becoming engaged in the largest African war of modern times,
destroying nine years of political and economie reform efforts, allowing human
casualties in the tens of thousands in two year's time, and siphoning off huge public
funds for Investment and infrastructure to a destructive war effort. These leaders
(who were pets of the donor community) went squarely against the declared policy
priorities of the WB and the donors, who did not see this war coming because they did
(do) not make a good analysis of the political dynamics of these states. In addition,
when countries become embroiled in war, the existing structural aid programmes,
agreed upon and needed for long-term capacity building, etc., may be suddenly eut off.
The effect of such a cut-off on state policy is usually questionable, especially when the
government or ruling elite sees essential interests threatened in the conflict.
This chapter has a very useful overview of "causes of conflict" (p. 58f.),
among them the high dependency on natural resources, low incomes (for young men),
lack of democratie rights, and the small size of many African countries (although more
causal factors of a political and socio-cultural nature coul also be mentioned). The need
for conflict resolution, peace building and state reconstruction is also emphasized as
conditional for development, whereby Mozambique is cited as an (exceptional)
example.
Most remarkable in this chapter is the WB's renewed emphasis on the
importance of the state, not only as a political and judicial structure but also as an
economie agent. This is a kind of reappraisal of previous WB positions, although they
will not admit this. Consequently, this chapter outlines a program of recovery and
•" The World Bank now also recognizes thé importance of 'civil society' organizations, like (presumably)
trade unions, voluntary associations of citizens, etc.. The ideological trappings of 'civil society'-thinking
are, however, not discussed. It is not an unproblematic category.
l
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capacity-building, which was severely dented by almost two decades of 'state
slimming' in the period of the SAPs. fl
The critique of African state performance is not mild, but in the heat of the
argument it is forgotten that much of the problems described also apply to many •
Western/industrial country governments: inadequate civil service, corruption, *
inefficient budgeting, bureaucracy, etc. Political accountability, government m
commitment to reform, représentation and power sharing are seen as indispensable V
for successful governmental institutions and for stability. A new catchword is
decentralization, but a critical assessment of the meanings of this term in the African ||
context is not made.
The list of required characteristics for political reform, good governance and l
institutional development in Africa given here is quite awesome. No indication is given
of how concrete African politics are rooted in society and constrained by historical and B
cultural factors mediating 'power', redistribution of resources and eiite politics33. *
An encouraging point is that the WB finally explicitly acknowledges the importance of «|
the rule-of-law, and of strengthening the (independent) judiciary and législature. m
This chapter deals with the core issue of World Bank policy to come: Addressing
poverty and inequality. The stated ideal of reducing rising poverty is to be B
achieved by economie growth together with a réduction in inequality. Hère a new (and
long overdue) plea is made to register and measure dimensions of poverty in terms of •
the afflicted people themselves (as in Box 3.1, 'Voices of the Poor', p. 85). Food ™
insecurity, décline of Systems of social support, psychological damage, traumatic M
gender relations, and distrust of state institutions spring out as the most relevant (
aspects. The question is not asked about how this pattern of increased poverty was
related to décline in governmental services and state institutions in the last decades, •
but that there is a link seems obvious.
Inequality (in terms of income, social spending, consumption patterns, and B
access to services) is very marked in Africa, and is tenacious. It is prevalent both in
the urban and rural sectors. •
Predictably in this report, the stratégies outlined to reduce poverty focus ™
primarily on macro-economie and structural policies that could encourage growth and ,_
employaient. But there is also a stress on the need for 'inclusive policies', the B
development of 'better capabilities' of people, a focus on gender problems, and more
efficiënt 'delivery mechanisms'. Here the account reverts to a high level of abstraction |
and normative thinking and the link with actual practice is rather tenuous.
33 Compare, e.g., P. Chabal & J.-P. Daloz, Africa Works. The Political Instrumentaüzation of Disorder






Government policy and commitment is highly overrated. No good analysis is made of
current patterns of labour migration and alternative employment stratégies of the
poor themselves, and of thé extent of différences between countryside and urban areas.
One problem is not mentioned: that of displaced people and refugee flows and thé human
Investment needs this evokes. An essential ingrédient to combat poverty and social
exclusion is said to be Investment in health and éducation services.
Chapter 4
This latter point is then elaborated in Chapter 4, Investing in people. The
chapter describes thé magnitude of thé educational and heaith crises in Africa, and thé
négative effect these have had on economie growth and overall development. One
underlying factor is the continued high population pressure, despite high mortality.
Africa's 'fertility transition' proceeds very slowly, and in some countries (like
lienya, or Ethiopia) hardly at all. Life expectancy is low, disease rampant. Incomes are
low, the tax basis is narrow, savings are too low, and state budgets to invest in 'human
capital' are correspondingly limited. The spread of HIV/AIDS is only the latest and
most dramatic illustration of this human development crisis. The report suggests that
African governments show a definite lack of commitment in combating AIDS (except
Senegal and Uganda) and in reducing fertility.
The report makes proposais to improve 'service delivery mechanisms' for
Investments to reach the people (e.g. by decentralization), reassesses criteria of
resource use efficiency, and redefines the rôle of international coopération. The
normative and hopeful text presented hère, especially on éducation, is not warranted
by the facts on the ground. There are deep-rooted problems that will take much more
time to address than admitted here. Again, the possible impact of past WB/IMF policies
on African state budgets and concomitant décline in health and éducation services is not
discussed.
The health sector should get major Investments. The remarkable case of the
successful campaign against onchocerciasis (river blindness), on p. 121, is held up as
an example of what is possible if a Western Company coopérâtes with local
governments, international agencies and NGOs. This debilitating disease is almost
eradicated. But this lone example also shows how little of such efforts in the field of
healthcare in Africa were done in the past. Only in the last few years, a similar
venture is planned to fight malaria, always seen as thé disease of poor people in thé
tropics.
Ultimately, thé aim to reach thé internationally agreed development goals for
thé year 2015 (which include achieving universal primary éducation, eliminating
gender disparities, etc.) is laudable but difficult to meet.
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Chapter 8
This chapter addresses problems of aid dependency, debt, and the challenges of
'partnership' between Africa and the developed world.
International aid will be necessary in the foreseeable future, because of the
large savings gap, capital flight, and low investment and growth rates. If aid is reduced
more, consumption will not grow and poverty will not decrease. Still, aid is seen as
not having delivered on its promises: it has not sufficiently fostered development.
Explanations are sought in the relatively unfavourable geography, in the domestic
environment (individual countries' sub-standard political and economie management
and lack of commitment), and also in donor countries' self-interest in supplying the
aid (p. 242). Furthermore, it is rightly admitted that 'donor dominance' has inhibited
local initiative and choice, capacity building and transparency.
What is not discussed is - when donor dominance is regretted - how then to deal
with the political conditionalities that donor countries and the WB will keep asking of
African governments (see Chapter 2).
In addressing the improvement of aid efficiency, delivery and 'ownership',
there is a discussion of the 'fragmentation' of international aid. A remark is made in
passing on the "intrusive micro-management by a host of uncoordinated donors" that
serve no one's interest (p. 237). This unfair remark again glosses over the fact that
such donors (often NGOs) jumped in to repair the social damage done by WB/IMF SAPs.
The 'business plan' for Africa presented here emphasizes the by now familiär
WB refrain that aid should be 'more effective' and should be included in récipients'
national budgets. An important remark (p. 237) is that the "underlying principles"
of aid procurement (a comprehensive approach, strong ownership, decentralization ,
selectivity, partnership and participation) "need to become integrated with the socio-
political processes of recipiënt countries". This sounds good, but my impression is
that in practice these partly non-economie principles are often simply jettisoned in
the implementation phase.
Another line is the need to "forge a new strategie partnership" (p. 247). Here
the key éléments are deconcentrating aid delivery, empowering local communities, put
Africans in charge of their development planning, with (external) development
partners recognizing Africa's leadership and responsibility. These are well-sounding
ideological formulae, but the practical political and social constraints, and factors like
government and elite interférence in this process, are not discussed. Some plans
proposed (like the 'sector programmes' on p. 254) would probably not even work in
the developed world.
The__chapter rightly pleads for a more equal partnership between donors and
récipients. But it again ultimately gives the economie and managerial perspective from
the donor community. This reflects the perpétuai dilemma of manoeuvring between an
I
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external agenda of economie reform, efficiency, good governance, committed political
reform, etc., and the needs, aspirations and capacities of the various countries.
The report repeatedly states that "major changes" are needed, and as soon as
possible. But as the current difficult negotiations on debt relief indicate, it is unlikely
that radical and speedy changes will be forthcoming. Africa's development will take
more time and be more graduai than anticipated hère.
5. A summary assessment
Despite its high public relations character, this report enhances the reader's
understanding of the complexities and factors involved in Africa's economie
performance and development challenges. As such, it is essential reading. But neither
the interprétation of all what happens on the continent in economie terms, nor its
policy* prescriptions need to be accepted in their entirety. Within the WB frame itself,
alternatives are possible. Outside the WB frame, a broader and more context-sensitive
understanding of political, social and cultural factors defining the economie and
development challenges is necessary, if only for the sake of argument.We need 'counter
narratives' of development.34 Most of the ambitious agenda of the WB is a statement of
intent, and as yet insufficiently operationalized or tested by reality.
Critical questions therefore remain about the linkage between this général, at
times abstract and ideological, survey of Africa's problems and the possible remedies
on the one hand, and the local-level implementation of aid packages to be carried out by
either the WB/IMF and other donors, on the other. Especially IMF policies will not
have much eye for the socio-economic complexities of the various African countries
but will just apply 'sound banking practices', as they do in the rest of the world.
Furthermore, in implementing the aid and development schemes 'on the
ground', it would not be advisable to leave this only to WB/IMF, government and
foreign embassy people, who are by définition somewhat removed from daily practice.
Development experts (both local and foreign) are not above criticism and local
évaluation, but their input is valuable in that they often have contextual knowledge and
can make realistic assessments from field expérience. In many projects their input is
even indispensable. In addition, people in Africa appreciate the human input of and
dialogue with foreigners. They do not only want to be seen and treated as 'eternally
needy' persons without social and cultural values or human dignity but also want to
show and discuss with outsiders how they make sense of their lives, even if poverty,
disease and conflict make survival difficult.
See: Emery Roe, Except-Africa. Remaking Development, Rethinking Power (New Brunswick-
London: Transaction Publishers, 1999). Cf. also Chabal & Daloz, cited above.
I
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6. Suggestions and points of critical reflection
I conclude by making some général points of criticism on thé WB report which build
upon its analysis of African problems and its positive recommendations.
* Despite ail its hedging, thé report betrays a somewhat dogmatic belief in the positive
rôle of market forces, free from 'government interférence'.
Apart from thé unrealistic flavour of this position, in Africa no economy - however
'liberalized' in thé formai sensé - will remain free of government élite interférence
(Ethiopia is a case in point: the state companies privatized since 1991 were 'sold'
largely to (members of) the well-entrenched ruling political party). This market
force belief is evident in the ambiguous statements in the report on the positive rôle of
globalization, on the WTO, and on the cancelling of trade barriers (However, unilateral
or forced abolishing of trade tariffs for domestic markets by African countries would
be disastrous to their économies and amount to a sell-out). In addition, we all know
that the Asian 'tigers' were economically pushed forward by state action, not by the
market. It is also forgotten that the greater belief in the 'automatically bénéficiai'
effects of market forces is partly responsible for the (much deplored) décline in aid
budgets of the developed world (from $ 32 per capita in 1990 to $ 19 in 1998; see p.
236-7).
If there is an assumption in this report that capitalism and globalization lead to 'good
governance' and democracy, then that is a big misunderstanding. There is no such
causal link at all (Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s is a good example; or Kenya
in the last 20 years: capitalist, but going from bad to worse). Other factors intervene:
political culture, ecological-geographic characteristics, ethno-regional divisions.
* There is no single road to 'development'. Views and expectations of economie growth
and what this means are diverse, also in Africa. The South African model, with its huge
costs in crime, violence and social disruption, is certainly not the ideal among many
other African nations. The réduction of humiliating poverty, dependence and
marginalization can indeed be an ideal shared by all, but the unrestricted opening up of
markets, the pressure to submit to the WTO regime, more dependency on Imports and
the inflow of western consumer products are not universally accepted and have more
than one time path. There is also disagreement over what 'development' means. There
are cases of relatively independent and functioning pastoralist societies in Africa that
were doing fine (although on a low technological and material level) until external
interférence (a state or international agency) came along, marginalizing them and





* The report seems to privilege global economie market forces over and above state
• reform and the furthering of African 'government activism'. The latter, stimulating a
* just, democratie environment, creating equality before the law, business protection,
free association and free press - in short a democratie environment with more rule-
of-law guarantees - is much more important than assumed in international
development discourse. The 'good governance' ideal is not on/y about economie
l accountability and transparency, etc. It is also about the politics of democracy. Once in
place, or at least better guaranteed than now, democratie initiatives will by
I themselves enhance economie enterprise and investment. Fear of governmentk i 5
>%| ;*;|S« arbitrariness stunts people's readiness to invest in long-term productive ventures.
1*1 ui t * Hence, there should not be too many compromises with African governments renegingalt * 'on the democratie rights of their people even if they are giving in to the neo-liberal
I
1' economie 'reform' demands of WB/IMF.
!lj 'n i '" *
In addition, the hold of global financial and economie forces on a country's economy
$ ^4 ^ ^ %
w|l be resented on nationalist grounds. European Union countries can perhaps afford
not to be nationalist, because they are developed and closely integrated in a
transnational economy, but in Africa this does not hold. There is, e.g., already growing
resentment in Africa against the arrogant expansion of South African business
interests on the continent.
*sj|)ere is much talk of a 'new partnership' between African countries/governments
and the donor community. It remains unclear under what conditions this has to take
s|ape. On the basis of agreements and joint performance no doubt, but in reality such
'partnership' remains both volatile (susceptible to sudden interruption, as in the case
of Ethiopia in the Ethio-Eritrean war of 1998-2000) and determined by the donor
countries and institutions. Africa's chances to impose or propose its own conditions
will be limited.
* It remains to be seen how far the WB's new emphasis on poverty réduction finds
concrete résonance in the IMF and the WTO. These financial organizations have no
agenda of Ideals for human development except GDP growth and hopes of a 'trickle-
down effect'.
The report's sections on aid delivery more directly to African populations, to the
local communities, are encouraging. Not all aid should go to, or through, government
agencies. Local NGOs and their foreign counterparts remain vital, although they can be






* The report seems to underestimate the effects of 'external shocks' and political
upheavals on the economy. Some of these shocks are part of the wider political context,
which is not taken in by the WB as a variable inextricably linked to economie
processes, but kept outside the analysis. These effects (e.g., of the 1973 oil crisis) are
referred to several times, but ignored are their political origins in the world System.
This s particularly evident in times of warfare. In addition, the much applauded
process of globalization will increase Africa's sensitivity to these external shocks,
while they will not have the institutional and financial capacity to deal with their
negative effects (in contrast to the Asian countries after the crisis of 1997).
* The link of proposed economie policies with environmental issues is rhetorically
stated in the report, but it remains highly doubtful how the WB and IMF will deal with
this vital issue in their country assistance stratégies35. Desk planning and writing is
often far removed from actual practice. (The recent incident with the large dam in
China - Implementation of which would have caused irreparable damage to the
environment - was only called off after huge external pressure and noise from non-
World Bank circles).
* The nature of 'privatization' should be defined and scrutinized more closely. There is
no politically unambiguous procedure of privatization. Some processes of privatization
effectively concentrate assets into the hands of a new elite, which may be as restrictive
to compétition and access to resources such as capital and labour as the state-
sponsored system. A critical analysis should be made of who privatizes to whom, and
what are the long-term effects on the national economy in terms of the stated
development goals?
* Massive Investment in and innovative fiscal policy towards African industry remain
a necessity, to produce qualitatively acceptable commodities for thé local markets,
absorb local 'excess labour capacity' and, due to lower priées compared to imports,
stimulate local demand. For this sector, a measure of state protectionism is inévitable.
One cannot deny African countries this strategy: it was also used by industrial
countries in the past 150 years to build up their own national manufacturing
économies.
35 Most of these are confidential anyhow, but the few I saw do not show any major concern with
safeguarding thé African environment. However, environments in Africa have been deteriorating very fast
in the past few decades, and to halt this process, more funds should be made available for this as an
integral part of any development scheme.
l
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* The WB should use more of its resources for joint venture research projects with
E scientists from both developed and African countries, in an ongoing, multidisciplinary
dialogue, not only of economists.
• * The debt problem should be addressed as an uintegral part of the stratégies of
•f










Summary of Chapters 5 and 7.
Henk Meilink
Chapter 5: Lowering Infrastructure, Information and Finance Barriers
The Bank notes that the current state of 'hard infrastructure' (transportation, water,
télécommunications, ports, bridges etc.) and 'soft infrastructure' (the financial
sectors) constitute serious barriers to development. Infrastructure should be
considered as a crucial input to all other forms of production. Africa lags far behind
other developing areas regarding quantity, quality, costs and equality of access. And the
gap is widening. Inadequate maintenance has also rapidly reduced the value of past
Investments. It is estimated that one third of Africa's roads have eroded from lack of
maintenance in the last 20 years. Compared to other régions, Africa's internai
transport costs are notoriously high and a major cause for its lack of international
competitiveness. This is due to a combination of Iow road quality, high fuel taxes, high
imported vehicle costs and costly bureaucratie procedures. Road blocks and bribes
further raise costs. But even more damaging for competitiveness is the unreliable
delivery service of many African firms. This is often related to production stoppages
and unreliable communication and information Systems.
Inadequate infrastructure also impedes the intégration of domestic markets. It
condemns rural areas to isolation, subsistence-production and high transaction risks.
Access to infrastructure services (especially safe water, electricity and sanitation) is
more unequal in Africa than in any other part of the world. Better infrastructure and
\
associated falling transport costs would create opportunities for high-value
production, including non-agricultural produce. This could (according to the Bank)
open-up 'the classic path out of poverty for rural households the world over' (p.139).
Better rural transport and water infrastructure would especially benefit women as
they bear the biggest transport bürden.
The causes of lagging infrastructural provisions are manifold: the vastness of the
continent with its sparse population mostly living far from the sea; widespread
poverty and subséquent low effective demand; the large number of small states and a
lack of regional coopération; insufficient Investment (in the 1990s new Investments,
including donor funds for infrastructure, feil dramatically) and government dominance
in the management of infrastructural projects.
To improve the situation Africa must boost Investment ($18 billion a year, some 6%
of GDP is required). The best pay-off will be not so much in new projects as in
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Investment in rehabilitation and maintenance. The Bank also recommends more private
- sector participation because past government infrastructure investment often led to
low efficiency and high costs. To attract more (foreign) investment, African
governments need to improve thé business climate. Contract enforcement, compétitive
taxes and adhérence to transparent rules are all imperative.
Linking African countries with each other and the rest of the world can be improved by
npore intensified régional coopération. Cross-border projects such as 'The Transport
Protocol for Southern Africa and thé Maputo Corridor' between Mozambique and South
Africa are good examples.
Within individual countries, thé best way to widen access to services is to enhance
9ommunity and user involvement in infrastructure construction, maintenance and
management. Local participation should be complemented by greater autonomy to
ensure that projects meet local requirements, use local materials, technology and
labor and can operate at low costs.
fjur^ermore Africa can also greatly benefit from the new information and
communications technology. It is estimated that more than three in five Africans can
currently be reached by radio transmitter networks. Telecentres where people can
make phone calls and receive and send faxes and e-mails are on thé increase. Internet
growth in Africa has been spectacular although access is largely confined to capital
cities. The Internet is an effective means of exchanging product information for African
businesses. Farmers can also greatly benefit from rapid knowledge of market priées
and agricultural research innovations. The potential of ICT in thé éducation and health
sectors is similarly very promising. It can make an important contribution to
'empowering people' (p. 157). African governments must educate their people m thé
use of information and communications technology and use ITC to improve their own
governance. Régional coopération again is of key importance in achieving économies of
scale and lowering costs.
The last thème taken up in this chapter is thé necessity of a well-functioning financial
system. An efficient System générâtes and channels foreign and domestic financial
resources between savers and investors to high-return investments. However most
financial Systems in Africa are weak. Limited savings are mobilized and credit to the
private sector is modest and costly. This can be largely attributed to the legacy of heavy
intervention in the finacial sector by African governments in past decades. Private
banks were nationalized, state banks established, interest rates were administrative^
set and the allocation of credit controlled. 'This encouraged politically motivated loans
and corruption, diverted funds from intended purposes and contributed to capital flight'
(p.162). _
The reforms pursued in the 1990s attempted to rectify these problems by mainly
focusing on liberalizing interest rates and removing ceilings and other controls on
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credit allocation. But these reforms have been less successful than anticipated. The
expected positive effect on savings mobilization and credit allocation has not
materialized and governments remain reluctant to privatize state banks.
The main reasons for the disappointing results suggested by the Bank is the incorrect
sequencing of reform policies with financial reform preceding macro-economie
stabilization. The result was that interest rates were often liberalized before fiscal
déficits were brought under control. The resulting higher interest rates increased
internai government debt, crowded out private credit and contributed to further macro
imbalances. Other explanations include: incomplete reforms with state banks
continuing to lend to loss-making public firms; high transaction risks which induce
banks to hold public debt securities at the cost of seeking out new private lending
opportunités; and poor liquidity management. Evidently financial reform in Africa is a
long-term process involving the development of complicated governance procedures
and the development of trust and policy credibility.
To improve the financial system in Africa the Bank suggests focusing on a number of
priorities including: increasing access to basic financial savings and credit services
for small borrowers now neglected by the large commercial banks (the success of
micro finance rural institutions is an encouraging recent development); intensifying
links between formai institutions (mobilizing deposits) and informal micro finance
agents (allocating these savings); improving accounting standards, disclosure
requirements and contract law; and lessening the dominance of large commercial banks
through increasing the number of 'non bank financial institutions' such as pension
funds and insurance companies. And again the Bank advocates more régional coopération
arguing that pooling resources in a larger régional capital market would better attract
domestic and international finance. Many national économies in Africa are too small to
develop well-capitalized and productive financial institutions on their own.
Chapter 7: Diversifying Exports, Reorienting Trade Policy and Pursuing
Regional Integration
Over the past 30 years Africa has lost out much of its share in global trade, even in
traditional primary goods. Prospects for these goods are gloomy with their income
elasticity typically low and their terms of trade declining and volatile. Africa has failed
to achieve export product diversification on any scale.
To make African économies more compétitive a number of policies are needed: sustained
stable and compétitive real exchange rates, the removal of the remaining anti-export
bias, intégration of trade reform policies with a national business plan for economie
diversification, pursuing régional intégration, increased participation in multilateral
l
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s such as the World Trade Organization, and forge a supportive and
consultative relationship between government and the private sector.
Économie diversification is needed in view of the rapidly growing urban
agfjpmeçations. Creating a productive urban economy is also essential to provide
ployment and ensured income for these future cities. But it is unlikely that
diversification can be based solely on traditional agricultural exports and
cÉ>1rfestictimarkets. The focus should be on Africa's manufacturing export firms. When
"î <n i |5^#! *
exßosed to international compétition, efficiency will increase and transfer of
fjî l«
teehnolpgy and management knowledge will enhance productivity gains for these firms.
'• 't * *;*!
TlfèHBjtflk's position is that while increasing traditional exports, Africa can diversify
ari1|a|!S| ̂ compétitive 'across a broad range of products' (p.212). A prerequisite,
hollber, is that government policies and institutions be improved and transaction
* *^T^ S J*i|ïa^ * ? '• ^
costl jjpwered. Where economie management has improved, the Bank cites évidence of
rapid 'grpwth in nontraditional exports: Ghana, Uganda, Madagascar and Mozambique in
998 (reform) period. Horticulture, labor-intensive manufacturing and
thlrffsurist service industry are given as promising inroads.
|pand Africa's export potential a business plan is again required. The Bank
isiî sses the components of such a plan and once more stresses the need for
l*compétitive and stable real exchange rates and 'a hospitable and attractive environment
fpr foreign capital' (p.220). Furthermore Africa's trade taxes and restrictions (still
plljh^pompared to other régions) need further reform. This issue is however not free
jlïp^controversy. The Bank admits that African governments substantially dépend on
apjtemational trade taxes for their revenues (in particular taxes on intermediate and
ftal goods imports) and that trade liberalization can undermine the level of state
prévenues. It is therefore emphasized that 'efforts to reduce trade taxes cannot proceed
îndependently of measures to strengthen other sources of fiscal revenues' and that
»afurther trade liberalization should be anchored in an overall export promotion
,!âtrategy (p.222-3). The latter should include deepening régional intégration and
BJjyp
'work within - and influencing - thé evolving rules of thé global trading system'
(p. 223). The Bank admits hère (although in a somewhat obscure fashion) that
country-based SAPs 'are not always compatible with régional coordination' (p. 222).
Yet it acknowledges that thé case for économie intégration in Africa remains
compelling. Past progress has been disappointing largely because régional intégration
was conceived as an inward-looking instrument of industrialization by way of
aggregating small national économies into régional markets.
Concerns about an implicit loss of national sovereignty and unequal growth and
polarized industrial transformation within thé région hâve also played a rôle. The Bank
advocates a type of intégration based not so much on freer trade but on better policy
'll
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coordination and collaboration between governments in joint regional Investment
projects (particularly in thé transport, energy and communication sectors).
Within individual countries trade liberalization should also be accompanied by other
measures beyond thé narrow boundaries of thé trade regime. These measures must
attract substantial Investment for export expansion. One of the main problems is the
high cost of doing business in Africa. Weak business services, inadéquate transport and
communication infrastructure, restrictive régulations and rent-seeking, a lack of a
supportive relationship between business and government and thé lack of a skilled
work force constitute other major impediments (p.224).
The chapter closes with a short discussion of Africa's future place in thé world trading
system. It predicts that as a resuit of continued global liberalization, 'there will be a
continuing érosion of thé préférences enjoyed by African countries' (p.231). And as
thé rule-making of thé World Trade Organization (WTO) progresses, African countries
will face large financial costs when complying to its myriad standards and obligations.
The Banks warns that thèse standards have been developed 'with little input from the
least developed countries and that there is the ever-present danger that they will be
used to protect (rieh countries') markets' (p.231). To safeguard African interests a
sub regional pooling of regional intégration schemes is of paramount importance.
Leiden, September 2000
